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ABSTRACT 
Custody disputes have traditionally been considered a legal matter. More recent trends have 
seen the recognition of divorce and custody as both legal and psychological events. This 
necessitated the involvement of professionals of the helping services in custody 
recommendations. Such a multidisciplinary approach is currently taken by the Office of the 
Family Advocate, Pretoria, in disputed custody matters. 
It is suggested that the way in which the problem of custody is currently defined, is on a 
pragmatic level, and does not include a higher-order awareness as implied by an ecosystemic 
epistemology. Such an awareness denotes self-reflexivity, and calls for a more aesthetic 
emphasis. The dialectic between aesthetics and pragmatics is maintained by means of a 
descriptive look at the various systems involved in a disputed custody case. Adopting an 
ecosystemic epistemology is recommended, through the metaphor of mediation, as a further 
evolution of an already changing process. 
Key terms: 
Custody; Custody Evaluations; Case Study; Multidisciplinary Teams; Ecosystemic 
Epistemology; Family Mediation; Office of the Family Advocate; Descriptions; Aesthetics; 
Family Therapy. 
CHAPTER 1 
An Introduction 
Overview 
Disputed custody of children during or after divorce is traditionally considered a matter for 
the courts (Black, 1982; Camplair & Stolberg, 1987; La Cock, 1983; Steinberg, 1988). 
However, there has been an increasing reliance, both locally and internationally, on the 
assistance of child and family experts in advising the legal system. on custody matters and 
decisions (Lind, 1989; Steinberg, 1988; Volgy & Everett, 1985a). Therefore various 
professions have become involved in the management of custody matters, which now often 
involve multidisciplinary intervention (Camplair & Stolberg, 1987). Such professionals include 
lawyers, the family advocate, psychologists and social workers. These different agencies all 
conceptualise the problem in different ways (Lambiase & Cumes, 1987), based on the 
epistemology or worldview they subscribe to. This in tum, will determine the nature of the 
intervention that follows, with regards to the management of cw t· Jdy disputes. 
It is suggested that the various multidisciplinary approaches to custody disputes are all based 
on an epistemology adhering to the tenets of reductionism, lineal causality and neutral 
objectivity (Fourie, 1990). This refers to the way in which problems are viewed and therefore 
has direct bearing on the way in which they are 'treated' or managed. Reductionism refers to 
the notion of having to reduce an object or phenomenon to its most pasic elements in order to 
understand and measure it. Grasping the whole is therefore contingent upon recombining the 
parts (Schwartzman, 1984). 
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Lineal causality refers to the cause-and-effect principie. One event/action causes another as a 
function of the property ofthe causal agent. Lastly, neutral objectivity refers to the notion that 
everything that is observed is perceived independently from the person observing it. In the 
search for 'truth', that search itself is then not thought to affect "the 'truth' (Schwartzman, 
1984). For instance, the legal system follows an adversarial approach. This process employs a 
third party as a 'judge' of the worth of the claims of each parent (Houlgate, 1987). The family 
advocate is assigned the task of hearing the evid_ence from both sides, and acting in the best 
interest of the children, based on the individual descriptions of family members from outside 
agencies. As a court decision is generally considered fair and thus final, it implies neutral 
objectivity or objectivity of observation. Furthermore, the case presented to the court is 
divided into two camps, each represented by professionals that highlight intrapsychic qualities 
of that person (parent) in order to gain custody, which is in keeping with the principle of 
reductionism, where the whole of the former family systems and the patterns of interaction 
I 
that transpired from these are not taken into account. In another instance the social work 
system also tends to focus on the intrapsychic needs of the children, while independent 
psychologists might si.t; Jarly present data of an intrapsychic nature proclaiming the 'goodness' 
or 'badness' of a particular parent. 
With regards to both parents and children such assessments and explanations are therefore 
done in isolation of their place, role and function in a family unit. This again reduces the 
whole into measurable elements which in this case often are concepts such as subconscious, 
aggression, resistance and defence mechanism which are treated as if they were real entities 
(Fourie & Lifschitz, 1988). Lineal causality is also implied as one parent may be blamed for 
this or that symptom or characteristic of the child, negating the complex and recursive 
functioning of a family system, and the effects of the larger agency network on the process of 
symptom production and maintenance. 
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Problem Definition 
A custody dispute therefore involves the family, which can be said to be a dysfunctional 
former system (Everett & Volgy, 1983), and a multidisciplinary network of professionals. For 
the purpose ofthis study, the problem can be defined on three levels: 
1. On a first-order cybernetic level (Hoffman, 1990), it can be said that the assessment of, 
and intervention with these families are traditionally based on a lineal perspective which fails to 
recognise the complexities of systemic family processes (Everett & Volgy, 1983). The major 
limitations of the traditional model is that events are viewed in an atomistic, reductionistic 
way, which impedes the possibility of seeing patterned events. From this perspective, the 
professional is also seen as being in a hierarchical relationship with the family system. 
2. On a second-order cybernetic level, the recursive effects of the mutual influences between 
members of the system comprising of professionals and the family, have not yet received 
attention with regards to the management of a custody dispute. The second-order view 
(Hoffman, 1990) sees the system as a self-organising, self-maintaining e. ;1 .ty, which includes 
the professionaVtherapist/expert, in a collaborative rather than a hierarchical structure 
(Golann, 1988; Hoffman, 1990). 
3. The third level concerns this larger system reaching a consensual domain of shared 
meanings. From a constructivist stance, it can be said that the divergence of different 
professional systems create a conversational context that permits the evolution of new 
meaning (Goolishian & Anderson, 1987). The professional and family system would therefore 
be what is termed by Goolishian and Anderson the 'problem determined system'. This is 
defined as a system comprising of everyone who enters into conversation about a problem. 
This system thus do~s.,..not conform to traditional system boundaries such as 'the family' or 'the 
marital couple'. Rather, it involves everyone including the therapist and other professionals, 
who interact through language about the problem. 
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Insofar as the current approach to custody settlement is termed multidisciplinary, this 
approach maintains the vantage point of each participant within their own discipline, while the 
interfaces between the conceptual frameworks of different disciplines are ignored (Auerswald, 
1968). 
The Aim of the Study 
The purpose of this study will be to explore the context of the settlement of custody 
disputes, including all the systems involved in such cases - therefore the whole ecological field 
- in order to describe the ways in which these various systems and the interaction between 
them result in the resolution of such a dispute, while taking a look at the process through 
which it arrives at such a point. In this case the study investigates the context of a family in 
which a dispute for custody of the children occurred. This family was referred to the Office of 
the Family Advocate in Pretoria. 
This implies an ecological approach (Auerswald, 1968), where the interfaces between th~ 
systems are not ignored, but tak< r; into account. The approach and assumptions underlying 
this study are therefore based on an ecosystemic epistemology, as defined by Keeney (1979). 
The ecosystem includes all the parties that form part of the relational system in which the 
problem of custody occurs, namely the family, their wider social network, the extended family, 
other professionals, welfare institutions and myself Auerswald (1987) suggests that when 
following an ecosystemic epistemology the research method should result in the evolution of 
an ecological narrative. The study thus describes (in stead of explains) the multiple, differential 
ideas held by all the systems relevant to the case, as well as the interventions that transpire as a 
result of this ecology of ideas. The 'results' are presented in the form of a description of the 
multiple realities, as expressed in ideas and interventions, over time, that evolve from the 
context of the family's disputed custody. 
Although the term epistemology has been used repeatedly so far, it forms the topic of 
discussion of chapter. 3, as it merits thorough discussion. It will therefore suffice to say here 
that the underlying epistemology (epistemology being the rules we apply in making sense of 
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our worlds) of this study is an ecosystemic one and can be contrasted with a positivist or 
Newtonian epistemology (Fourie & Lifschitz, 1988; Schwartzman, 1984). In applying these 
epistemological rules they clearly determine much of our behaviour and our interpretation of 
the behaviour of others. The notions I will express, as forming part of my epistemology, have 
important implications insofar as these reject the epistemological stance of linear thinking and 
dualism, including lineal causality, purpose and objectivity (Hoffman, 1981 ). In accordance 
with an ecosystemic stance I will therefore introduce and adhere to the notions of holism and 
ecology, acausality and constructivism. 
The Structure of the Study 
With chapters 2 to 4 representing the theoretical body of this work, chapter 2 presents a 
summary of the most relevant literature on custody. Chapter 3 attempts at identifYing and 
defining the epistemological concepts and ideas underlying this study, and making connections 
between them. Chapter 4, as an outflow from chapter 3, involves defining the methodological 
issues that arise from my epistemology, while also providing a structure within which the 
information gathered, may be presented. t 
Chapter 5 represents a case study in accordance with the guidelines presented in chapter 4, 
in which an attempt is made to illustrate as well as complexity the concepts discussed in the 
theoretical body of this study. 
Chapter 6 is a concluding chapter, along with a closer look at mediation and its possibilities. 
CHAPTER2 
Law and Social Science- The Literature on Custody 
Introduction 
Although a chapter of this nature traditionally includes a fairly representative perusal of the 
most current literature - in this case on custody issues and mediation - it is important to 
remember the epistemological framework within which this thesis is presented. From that 
perspective a literature survey represents a subjective and arbitrary punctuation of that which 
has been written about custody and mediation. 
Throughout this discussion the reader will become aware of the dualistic nature of the 
arguments presented: the adversarial approach versus mediation~ a mental health perspective 
versus a legal one~ lineal models of custody resolution versus systemic ones ... , which is 
referred to as "either/or dualities" by Keeney (1983a, p.3). In such cases, very often, only one 
side of such a distinction is accepted as the truth or more useful and more correct. The 
examples cited above, as derived from the literature, and presented in the rest of this chapter, 
are the result of such a dualistic way of drawing distinctions. Keeney (1983a, p.3) asserts that 
many such distinctions "are actually the two sides of a complementary relationship" and that 
the purpose of this thesis in general is to, like Keeney, "uncover patterns that connect both 
sides of these distinctions" - in other words overcoming the dualism: embracing a both/and 
rather than a either/or view of the phenomena. 
This then refers back to my choice of arguments and literature presented, being my own way 
of "punctuating the stream of experience so that it takes on another sort of coherence or 
sense" (Bateson, 1972, p.163), which would also reflect my epistemology. 
What follows is a summary of the literature on both the South African and international 
(mainly U.S.A and U.K) perspectives regarding custody and mediation reviewed, in the form 
of a historical overview. Presentations are made from both the legal and social science frames. 
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A Legal Narrative 
Divorce and Children: A Historical Perspective 
Over the years, changes in societal values and norms regarding the family and childhood 
have resulted in radical changes in the laws and outcome of adjudicated divorce and custody 
cases (Robinson, 1988; Wynne & Wynne, 1986). The welfare of the family, in the throes of 
divorce and a custody dispute is "likely to be determined by the values of the legislators and/or 
the officers presiding in the relevant courts" (Burman & Reynolds, 1986, p.119). 
Under the present law in South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States the 'best 
interest of the child' is the paramount and foremost consideration in custody decision-making 
(Bedil, 1988; Burman & Rudolph, 1990; Derdeyn, 1976; Hasten, Edwards, Nathan, & 
Bosman, 1980; Houlgate, 1987; Le Raux, 1987; Robinson, 1988). This was, however, not 
always the case. 
The rights of fathers. 
In the older western world, the father obtained absolute control over his children in judicial 
decisions under Roman law. Children were considered paternal property. The principle of 
absolute right of the father was thereafter also adopted by English common law, where it 
remained relatively unchallenged for centuries (Derdeyn, 1976; Robinson, 1988; Saposnek, 
1983; Volgy & Everett, l985b ). It was indeed only in the 18th century that the English court 
assumed jurisdiction over the welfare of children in need of protection. The reasons for the 
superior custody rights of fathers, both in England and the United States, were based on the 
father's superior financial position and the man's superior position in patriarchal society. The 
welfare of children seemed relatively unimportant during that time, as children were 
considered primarily in the service of their father. An economic constraint then also prevented 
a mother from obtaining custody, because a father was absolved of any maintenance in the 
case of a mother having custody over his children. Only once the man's financial responsibility 
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towards his children was acknowledged irrespective of who had custody, did a woman stand a 
better chance of assuming custody of minor children. (Derdeyn, 1976~ Saposnek, 1983) 
The .. tender years presumption". 
With the industrialisation of the western world, the status of women changed as they were 
given rights previously denied to them such as voting, being gainfully employed and owning 
property. A gradual shift towards a maternal preference in custody disputes (Luepnitz, 1986), 
came into being with the "tender years presumption", claiming that during infancy, when a 
child is in need of tender nursing, he or she will remain with the mother, but will return to the 
father once this period has passed, and such a child is in need of moral training (Derdeyn, 
1976; Saposnek, 1983; Volgy & Everett, 1985b; Wynne & Wynne, 1986). 
Derdeyn (1976, p.l371) states that "the tender years presumption was one of the first 
tangible legal issues on which the developing rights of the mother were based. The best 
interest of the child was the other". 
"The best interest of the child". 
Challenges to the law of custody of children resulted in the best interest of the child test or 
principle, which was equally an acknowledgement of the special developmental needs of 
children, as a strengthening of the mother's right to custody. 
This principle lead to the mother's superior right to custody based on a cultural assumption 
that the mother is better equipped to caring for children. Even though equality of the sexes 
have been proclaimed for years, statistics in most countries, including South Africa, show a 
vast majority of custody disputes being settled or decided in favour of the mother, unless 
definite evidence exists that exhibits misconduct on. the part of the mother (Burman & 
Rudolph, 1990; Derdeyn, 1976, Volgy & Everett, 1985b ). At present no legislated preference 
exists in South African law, in favour of either mother or father with regards to the allocation 
of custody (Hahlo & Kahn, 1975). 
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The "best interest of the child" principle, linked to the adversarial manner in which this is 
ascertained, does raise certain pertinent questions: working within this system, the best interest 
of the child is often decided, by proving the other parent unfit (parental culpability), with the 
implication that it would not be in the best interest of the child to award custody to that 
parent. This principle can therefore be said to be conducive to conflict between divorcing 
parents, because of vague standards and the process of polarisation engendered by such a 
system (Derdeyn, 1976; Robinson & Parkinson, 1985). 
Because the 'best interests' standard, unlike the older, tender 
years presumption, makes it possible for each member of the 
divorcing parents to press a claim for custody of the child, they 
have a strong motive to enter, or at least threaten to enter 
litigation. (Houlgate, 1987, p.19) 
The 'best interests' standard may therefore contribute to disputes between parents that, 
paradoxically, may be extremely harmful h.- the child. 
Another important influence in the history of custody disputes is the book published in 1973, 
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit. These authors 
proposed that custody be awarded to a single parent who is assessed as being the child's 
'psychological parent', and that it would be that parent who determines the extent of the 
remaining parent's involvement with the child(ren) (Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, 1973). 
Subsequent research have in fact opposed these speculations, and suggested that children's 
best interests are served if they have "continuous and regular contact with both parents" 
(Saposnek, 1983, pp.6-7). 
No-fault settlements. 
In the previous century it was often thought that the best interests of the child were adhered 
to when custody was awarded to the parent not at fault or not being the cause ofthe divorce. 
The underlying assumptions being that the guilty party would tend to repeat such wrongdoing 
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in subsequent relationships. Children would be better looked after by someone who had not 
transgressed the vows of marriage (Derdeyn, 1976). 
The no-fault divorce law made it possible for couples to get divorced without assigning 
blame in order to do so, which necessitated less litigation and more negotiation. Disputed 
custody is nevertheless still often settled by awarding blame perpetuating the adversarial 
nature thereof (Wynne & Wynne, 1986). The courts have, however, attempted to differentiate 
between the moral unfitness of a parent and their ability to give adequate care (Saposnek, 
1983). 
The no-fault divorce came into being in South Africa in 1979 by means ofthe Divorce Act, 
70 of 1979. This act incorporated the law regarding the interests of the children of a divorcing 
couple which included custody allocation (Section 6, Safeguarding of interests of dependent 
and minor children) (Burman & Rudolph, 1990; Burman & Reynolds, 1986; Hahlo & Kahn, 
1975; LeRoux, 1987; Lind, 1989). 
Joint custodv. 
Internationally, joint custody is a very recent development, and this trend has become a 
preferred and even mandated option. in some American states (Derdeyn & Scott, 1984; Nehls 
& Morgenbesser, 1980). Joint custody is described by Volgy and Everett (1985a) as 
analogous to the process of system mitosis in biological cell division. The system subdivides 
into two subsystems with one parent in each new "cell", and the sibling subsystem is replicated 
in each one of these divided "cells". A systemic justification for the wisdom of such an 
arrangement is given whereby it is argued that "the structure of joint custody most closely 
duplicate~ the original nuclear family system as compared to other types of custody" (p.140). 
It is therefore considered to most clearly approximate 'normal' family life (Volgy & Everett, 
1985(b)) and thus considered an option in the best interest of the child(ren) in custody 
disputes (Burman & Rudolph, 1990), which lead to the incorporation thereof into the custody 
legislation of certain countries. In South Africa, joint custody remains an unpopular alternative 
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and has only ever been granted in isolated cases, after the precedent was set in the court order 
pertaining to Kastan v Kastan (Bedil, 1988; Burman & Rudolph, 1990; Eckard, 1992). 
Another frequently ·cited subsequent case is that of Sch/ehusch v Sch/ehusch (Bedil, 1988; 
Burman & Rudolph, 1990) in which an application for joint custody was denied, which seems 
to be the South African judicial preference, although nothing prevents a South African court 
to order in favour of joint custody (Bedil, 1988). The argument against joint custody 
presented by the South African courts is that shared responsibility invariably leads to a 
deadlock situation between parents (Eckard, 1992) which then has to be settled by the court 
and therefore is not functional. Eckard (1992, p.44) describes the court's position as a 
"traditional" one and states that "the court seems to be saying that co-operation or 
communication between divorced parents in the interest ofthe child .. .is an illusion". 
Child custody evaluations. 
In the adversarial approach to decision-making in custody matters, it has become common 
practice to consult a psychologist for the purposes of evaluation and a concomitant report for 
one side of the conflicting parties. A referral from the party's atton1ey who may believe that 
such a report would strengthen their case, is the most common way in which the services of a 
psychologist are enlisted (Trombetta, 1981; Wynne & Wynne, 1986). Procedural law, which is 
responsible for establishing the adversarial approach to custody disputes, is limiting in terms of 
the amount and nature of information about a family that can be brought into court 
proceedings (Girdner, 1985). Only psychometric tests considered 'scientific' can be brought as 
evidence, and information is generally organised in such a way as to present a favourable 
image of the client in question, while seeking to disqualifY the opposing party as parent and 
caregiver. This takes place under the overriding assumption that what has to be determined, is 
which parent will further the best interests of the child. Insofar as this procedure takes place 
within the system of adjudication of divorce and custody disputes, and consultation is done on 
the basis of involving one party only, it serves to perpetuate conflict and polarisation. "The use 
of professional custody evaluations by behavioural science or other 'consultants"' is simply 
enlisted to "raise the quality of traditional custody adjudication" (Trombetta, 1981, p.13). 
Hoffmann (1989, p.l 07) also asserts that "the traditional service of custody evaluations has 
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retained its importance as a highly visible service rendered to the judiciary". It is therefore a 
question of therapists in the legal world, acting as 'hired guns' and subscribing to the rules of 
that world. 
Such evaluations can therefore formally be defined as: "psychological and behavioural 
assessments of individual family members, and examination of relationships between family 
members, conducted by psychiatrists, psychologists, and others" with the aim of determining 
"the best custodial arrangement for the children involved" (Trombetta, 1981, p.14). 
A psychologist or mental health worker can also be called to perform a custody evaluation 
as a service to the court, in which case such a professional does not represent either party, but 
is considered an impartial and objective third party. The criteria for employing such a 
professional will be based on their capacity for objectivity and skill in assessment procedures. 
Such a professional will have to furnish the court with a report of his or her findings and may 
have to be called to court to testify, in which case he or she would have to be able to 
withstand cross-examination. Such evaluations are generally demanded under the following 
circumstances, as listed by Hoffmar.n (1989, p.1 08): 
When parents are unable to reach an agreement. 
When one or both parents behaved in a way to harm or injure a child. 
When the social environment of one or both parents is considered detrimental to the 
child. 
When the child has problems which require special considerations as to which parent is 
best equipped to deal with it. 
When the non-custodial parent appears to have superior capabilities to the custodial 
parent in providing for the needs of the child(ren). 
When one or both parents abuse alcohol or drugs which prevents them from 
adequately parenting the child. 
When a current visitation order does not seem to meet the best interests of the child. 
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Although these evaluations are not performed in the service of one of the conflicting parties, 
it is still a procedure rooted in litigation, with a report being submitted to the court as 
evidence, an~ the final decision resting with a judge, based on this expert, and other evidence. 
Parents are therefore not recognised in terms of their contributions in this process, and the 
focus is on pathology or abnormality, which would preclude the custody of one or other 
parent over the child(ren). 
Divorce Mediation 
Divorce mediation, as alternative method of conflict resolution, arose in an attempt to find a 
more appropriate method of dispute resolution - given the inherent disadvantages of the 
adversarial approach (Egle, 1983; Hoffmannn & Wentzel, 1992; Houlgate, 1987; Howard & 
Shepherd, 1987; Koopman & Hunt, 1988; McGee, 1984; Mowatt, 1988) - and the fact that it 
has been acknowledged in legal circles that divorce, and therefore custody, disputes are more 
than mere legal events. 
As with many alternative models, mediation has its origins in the Far East, where disputes 
are settled by such means, and court litigation is disapproved of, for the disturbing effect it has 
on cosmic harmony (Mowatt, 1988), as well as in the Middle East, among the ancient 
Hebrews (Hoffrnannn & Wentzel, 1992). 
As an alternative method of conflict resolution, the rationale of mediation is to· provide a 
win-win approach to the resolution of conflict, as opposed to the win-lose adversarial 
approach (Grebe, 1986; Hodges, 1986; Hoffmann, 1987; Pruhs, Paulsen & Tysseling, 1984). 
Mediation (also called conciliation in British law) as an alternative form of dispute 
resolution, was adapted from a similar practice frequently employed in labour disputes and 
·political mediation (Egle, 1983; .Hoffmann, 1987). Through mediation the fact that divorce has 
a dual nature - that it is both a legal and a psychological process - becomes recognised 
(Girdner, 1985; Steinberg, 1988). It thus follows that mediation is an interdisciplinary process. 
Although this interdisciplinary nature of mediation has been recognised (Hoffmann, 1987; 
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Koopman & Hunt, 1988; Ruman & Lamm, 1983), it does seem to remain a practice under the 
auspices of the law (Pruhs, et a!., 1984) especially in South Africa (Le Raux, 1987). The 
major critics of mediation as an alternative means of divorce and custody dispute resolution, 
are also drawn from the ranks of legal professionals, who are intent on keeping conflict 
resolution in divorce and custody within the legal sphere, subjected to legal ethics (see 
Burman & Rudolph, 1990; Mowatt, 1988 in this regard). Howard and Shepherd (1987, p.8) 
point out that mediation or conciliation does not form part of a social science or legal tradition 
and is consequently "in danger· of being 'borrowed' by both group~ and distorted to fit their 
own respective ideas and objectives". 
Some of the major "measurable" benefits of mediation recognised by the legal fraternity and 
substantiated by research (Howard & Shepherd, 1987; Kresse!, 1987) are: 
a higher degree of compliance with settlement terms than obtained with litigation; 
a greater degree of compromise occurring during negotiations, and 
relatively lower costs involved. 
As an alternative means of dispute resolution, mediation is based on the principles of 
'empowerment and self-determination. It is not an adjudicatory but a co-operative process 
· (Wynne & Wynne, 1986). 
It facilitates a balance of power between the couple through 
· non-coercive means, thereby realigning the divergence 
between the spouses sufficiently to make them and their 
demands and wishes less diametrically opposed or damaging to 
each other and in consequence to the members of their family. 
(Hoffmann, 1987, p.9-10) 
A Brief South-African Historv 
Following the international trend, South African law recognised the constraints inherent in 
the adjudicatory system in dealing with issues of divorce and custody, and suggestions were 
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made that divorce (and custody) should no longer be regarded as solely in the legal domain. 
This necessitated a remodelling of the system, in order to incorporate the behavioural sciences, 
and to find more effective ways of coping with an ever increasing and complexifYing problem 
(Commission oflnquiry into the Structure and Functioning ofthe Courts, 1983; Lind, 1989). 
Under the Divorce Act (70 of 1979) provision is made for no-fault divorce (Section 4) as 
discussed earlier, as well as the safeguarding of the interests of dependent and minor children 
(Section 6) (Hahlo & Sinclair, 1980). In terms of this section a decree of divorce shall not be 
granted until the court: (a) is satisfied that the provisions made or contemplated with regard to 
the welfare of any minor or dependent child of the marriage are satisfactory or <l:_re the best 
that can be effected in the circumstances; and (b) if an enquiry is instituted by the Family 
Advocate in terms of section 4(I)(a) or (2)(a) of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters 
· Act, 1987, has considered the report and recommendations referred to in the said section 4( 1 ). 
In the remainder of the section referred to above, provision is made for the ordering by the 
court of any investigation, or appearance of any person before the court (with regards to 
safeguarding the intc1ests of dependent children). It also makes provision for the court to have 
the right to determine which parent or person will have guardianship or custody of such a 
dependent child. The court also retains the right to appoint a legal practitioner to represent the 
child at any such legal proceedings (Divorce Act, 70 of 1979, Section 6; Hahlo, 1985). 
Lind (1989) and the Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts 
(1983) suggest that although this Act does make provision for no-fault divorce, it does not 
eliminate the acrimony evident in divorce proceedings prior to 1979. These and other 
limitations of the South-African law, with regards to divorce and custody matters were 
addressed by the Hoexter Commission's final report in 1983. The Commission found that the 
fragmentation of jurisdiction renders the adjudication of family matters in South Africa 
inefficient. This resulted in the ineffective distribution and application of human resources and 
a lack of co-ordination between social services and the court (Commission of Inquiry into the 
Structure and Functioning of the Courts, 1983, p.487). This Co~rnission therefore 
controversially (regarding structure, manpower and costs) recommended the establishment of 
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a family court as an arm of the court, dealing exclusively with matters of family law 
(Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts, 1983; Hoffinann, 
1989; Hoffmann & Wentzel, 1992; Lind, 1989). According to the findings of the Commission, 
"the majority of lawyers were somewhat sceptical of the idea of a family court. On the other 
hand, representatives of social welfare agencies were almost unanimously in favour of the 
establishment of such a court" (Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of 
the Courts, 1983, p.464). With this recommendation in consideration as well as the awareness 
of the prominence of divorce mediation in other countries, legislation in the form of the 
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act (24 of 1987), was instituted. The Act provides 
for the appointment of Family Advocates for each of the divisions of the Supreme Court, by 
the Minister of Justice. 
The powers and duties of the family advocate evolve around 
instituting an enquiry to enable him to furnish the court at a 
divorce trial with a report and recommendations on any matter 
concerning the welfare of each minor or dependent child of thf' 
marriage or on such matters as requested by the court. 
(Hoffinann, 1989, p.1 05) 
The Act also makes provision for the appointment of a family counsellor for each division of 
the Supreme Court, to assist the family advocate with an inquiry. 
Hoffmann (1989, p.l06), however, points out that this statutory restructuring has resulted in 
a compromise between the strongly advocated mediation services, as employed in other 
countries, and the equally strongly advocated system of custody evaluation, in which case it is 
a continuation of the then existing service. The use of the word mediation in the title is 
considered an inaccurate interpretation of the process implicated thereby, as the content of the 
Act strongly implicates the process of custody evaluation. This incongruity makes room for a 
lack of clarity about the nature of services offered in general, as well as a lack of clarity about 
the provision of mediation or conciliation services specifically (Burman & Rudolph, 1990; 
Lind, 1989; Mowatt, 1988). 
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The growing interest in the possibilities of mediation as an alternative method of conflict 
resolution is reflected in the existence and activities of the South African Association of 
Mediators in Family Matters (SAAM), which is a non-profit 
association ofdivorce and family mediators (Goldstone, 1992; "Focus on Divorce," 1992). 
SAAM is the outcome of a collaborative effort of three professions namely law, psychology 
and social work, to "promote and formalise the use of family mediation with particular 
emphasis on divorce mediation" (Hoffmann & Wentzel, 1992, p.11 ). 
Initially launched as a pilot project, as recommended by the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Structure and Functioning of the Courts (1983), the Office ofthe Family Advocate came into 
being. The first family advocate, Adv. Francis Bosman, came into office on September 1, 1990 
("Die Advokate se Dienste," 1992), appointed by the former Minister of Justice, Mr Kobie 
Coetsee ("Unisa Academic, II 1990). Since then, offices have been opened in all the major 
centres in South Africa. The system of the family advocate is explained as "innovative" and 
"unique to South Africa" and represents an "interdisciplinary approach to family litigation 
concerning the custody and access of minor children" ("Looking After," 1992). 
A Behavioural Science/Mental Health Narrative 
Limitations of the Adversarial Approach 
Although the limitations of adversary in divorce and custody have been pointed out from 
within the legal ranks (Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the 
Courts, 1983; Koopman & Hunt, 1988; La Cock, 1983; Thoennes & Pearson, 1985), the vast 
majority of these arguments both locally and internationally, have been generated by scholars 
of the behavioural sciences (Camplair & Stolberg; 1987; Hoffmann & Wentzel, 1992; Kaslow, 
1984; Marlow, 1985(a) & (b); Robinson & Parkinson, 1985). It is these challenges to the 
adversarial process that have provoked changes in family law, the structure and functioning of 
the court, and the growing interest in mediation. 
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The Hoexter Commission found that the adversarial approach on which South African 
procedure is modelled, forces the parties into confrontation the moment the plaintiff enlists the 
services of an attorney, and that this procedure was not conducive to reaching a settlement 
that would last, nor to the possibility of reconciliation (Commission of Inquiry into the 
Structure and Functioning of the Courts, 1983). The Commission therefore recommended that 
"in the adjudication of family matters a shift in emphasis away from the adversary system of 
litigation towards more inquisitorial procedures would benefit the administration of justice" 
(Commission oflnquiry into the Structure and Functioning ofthe Courts, 1983, p.523). 
Marlow (1985(a)) describes the assumptions upon which the traditional adversarial approach 
rests, and states that these assumptions also have become the way in which we have come to 
view the process of divorce. These assumptions are: 
1. That divorce and marriage are legal events, which the state therefore has a right to 
control. 
2. That the failure of the marriage and the subsequent divorce were brought about by the 
misconduct of one of the parties. 
3. That the purpose of the judicial system is not only to bring about the divorce between two 
people, but also to inform them of their legal rights and obligations arising out of their 
marriage, as defined by the law. 
4. That the parties have conflicting and adverse interests, and that these conflicting interests 
not only characterise the dispute between them, but also give an explanation as to why it is so 
difficult for them to resolve. 
5. That the respective interests of the parties must be protected, and that it is the function of 
the law to do. so. The foundation of such protection is the judicial process, in the way it 
represents the respective parties, by separate attorneys. 
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The Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts (1983) 
confirms this view in its final report and also states that although no-fault divorce has been 
instituted, the acrimony between the spouses still exists, especially with regards to ancillary 
issues such as custody of the children. In such cases, unsatisfactory settlements are reached, 
which does eventually necessitate the involvement of social welfare agencies. 
It is suggested that this is an inappropriate set of assumptions, and limiting in terms of 
divorce and custody matters. Marlow ( 1985a) ·therefore also suggests an alternative set of 
assumptions by which to view the process of divorce - and therefore custody - matters: 
1 . Divorce is firstly a personal (as opposed to a legal) event. 
2. A family in the process of divorce should be viewed as in a state of crisis by which the 
structure oftheir relationships is threatened. 
3. There are no legal answers to personal matters, and the parties in ·~ divorce should not be 
lead to believe there are. 
4. Self-determination in terms of what is appropriate or not in their lives, should be granted 
to the divorcing parties, as all professionals are poor regulators of delicate relationships 
between people. 
5. A divorced couple with children, will have an ongoing relationship following divorce. In 
such a case it is necessary to resolve the dispute between the couple in such a way that they 
may be able to negotiate and conduct parental functions in future. 
6. Divorcing couples have conflicting interests, although it is not these that keep the couple 
from reaching an agreement, as assumed by the law, but the feelings of disappointment, hurt 
and anger. These feelings should thus be addressed in order to reach a settlement, in stead of 
them being exacerbated further as in the adversarial process. 
20 
7. Divorce should not be about a simplistic assigning of blame or praise to one party or the 
other. It should assume a holistic point of view, in which no single cause can be identified, and 
the focus is on the future, not the past. 
8. Divorce is not an occasion to right the wrongs from the marriage, as is often the view 
held by the traditional adversarial system. To encourage this view, is to create false 
expectations and preclude the necessary emotional closure that has to follow divorce. 
It is suggested that the "bereavement-related processes" in divorce and custody matters are 
often used and thereby exacerbated by the adversarial nature of adjudication, which is 
ineffective and inappropriate as couples are then seeking legal solutions to personal problems 
(Robinson & Parkinson, 1985, p.358). Specifically regarding custody, Houlgate (1987, p.19) 
asserts that the "best interest" standard applied in adjudicating such matters, is inherently 
defective, as standards are vague, giving parents an incentive, to fight, which promotes 
conflict. The employment of a third party as a judge of the worth of the claims of each party, 
also has competition as its natural cr'1sequence. Because they advocate for the 'rights' of one 
of the spouses, lawyers initiate the process of escalating the conflict between parties. Even 
thougq it may not be the intention of the lawyer to do so, it is inherent in the system within 
which they operate. Parties may then also deny their individual roles in this process of 
escalation by blaming their spouses or their lawyers. The outcome of adversary is the cessation 
of conflict, not the resolution thereof, which is imposed on the couple by an order of the court 
(Grebe, 1986). The adversarial nature of the formal judicial process is described as particularly 
harmful to people who have to maintain ongoing relationships, such as divorcing families 
(Koopman & Hunt, 1988). 
For similar reasons as given above, the Commission of Inquiry into the Stmcture and 
Functioning ofthe Courts (1983, p.522) found in favour of the creation offamily court, and 
recommended that it consists of the following two components: 
a social component to be known as the family court counselling service, and 
a court component 
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The family court counselling service was to fulfil three functions, namely: 
the reception process - for sifting and classification purposes; availability of counselling 
and legal advice; referral to marriage counsellors when reconciliation is a possibility; 
the conciliation process - for the facilitating of negotiation and .communication 
between estranged spouses and for the resolving of disputed points such as custody 
and access, and 
the supporting service to the court - in the case of adjudication of a family matter, the 
counselling service is to undertake the necessary investigation or action required by the 
court. 
What did, however, emerge is the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act (24 of 1987), 
which provides for a family advocate, for the further protection of the child, but no provision 
is made for conciliation or mediation in this Act, which makes the title misleading (Burman & 
Rudolph, 1990). As a service offered by the Office of the Family Advocate, mediation only 
takes place on the initiative of the relevant family advocate and the nature of such a , ~rvtce 
will depend on his or her definition thereof (Hoffmann & Wentzel, 1992). 
So, although the limitations of the adversarial approach to family disputes are recognised by 
most, there is a reluctance, especially on the part of the legal profession to adopt the other 
alternative, namely mediation as an interdisciplinary model, due to the threat ofthe blurring of 
professional boundaries it may incur - a blurring of boundaries and battle for control of the 
problem, between professions that have traditionally always been ill at ease with one another. 
Mediation as Alternative 
Scott-Macnab (1992) in an effort to define terminology used in alternative means of dispute 
resolution states that mediation is a process "largely based on the consent of the parties to a 
dispute and upon this consensual element reliance is placed on the parties complying with the 
terms of the mutual agreement" (p.21). This process is used as an alternative to ordinary 
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litigation "which is a final, adversarial, adjudicatory process maintained by the state and 
supported by negative or positive sanctions which it has the power to command" (p.21). 
If divorce is to be viewed as first and foremost a personal event (as opposed to a purely 
legal one) and mediation is considered a more appropriate means of conflict resolution within 
this view, mediation represents a paradigm shift in the way that we view divorce (Marlow, 
1985(a), p.4). 
As an alternative to the adversarial approach to child custody disputes, the co-operation of 
parents through mediation, to maintain better parent-child relationships, as well as functional 
relationships between adults, have been advocated widely (Trombetta, 1981 ). 
A basic purpose of the field of divorce, family and child custody 
mediation can be construed as the creation of viable postdivorce 
families, and the mediation focus can be conceptualized as the 
mutually determined creatior r:>f parental agreements that are 
equitable and functional for each party as the family enters into 
a new stage of life. In child custody mediation, these foci are 
best understood as the creation of a postdivorce/nonmarital 
family within which child growth and development can be 
enhanced. (Koopman & Hunt, 1988, p.383-384) 
Mediation as it is practised in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand is characterised by a variety of models of mediation developed after Coogler's initial 
work titled Structured Mediation and Divorce Settlements, published in 1978. It is generally 
considered a method of brief intervention, focusing on issues of family conflict, but in terms of 
co-operation as opposed to opposition. Emphasis is placed on parental responsibility, and the 
underlying premise is that of empowerment (Hoffmann, 1987). 
Hoffmann ( 1987) describes that central to any theory of mediation is an understanding of the 
phenomena of conflict. In mediation, the emphasis is on interpersonal conflict, especially to the 
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extent that is a continuation of conflict within the marriage or a function of unexpressed 
marital conflict. The aim is to create a win/win connotation, also creating a balance of power 
through non-coercive means. Other important features of the mediation process, as set out by 
Hoffmann are: 
the control of the mediator over the process; 
mediation may be a single session or lasting over a period of time; 
confidentiality is a feature, but judicially mandated reporting may limit such 
confidentiality; 
the mediator does not represent a party, and is solely concerned with reaching a 
settlement that both parties can live with; 
the focus of mediation is on the consequences of divorce; 
divorce mediation is an interdisciplinary endeavour; 
the development of a relationship between the mediator and couple does not have a 
therapeutic goal although the process may have therapeutic benefits for them; 
'11ediation is a structured process requiring active participation of all parties, and 
mediation does not replace the need for legal information and advice. 
Most models of mediation described in the literature focus on the above mentioned aspects, 
as well as the stages of the mediation process, and the strategies and skills of a good mediator. 
It is widely recognised that the process of mediation does take place within a legal context, 
and with legal decisions to be made, but it is also recognised that the context within which 
mediation is practised, has an influence on the process (Robinson & Parkinson, 1985). In this 
sense, mediation has a strong psychological component, with theories resembling those of 
family therapy. It will thus also be the emphasis of this dissertation, that, mediation practised 
from a family systems approach is most suited to taking the broader context into consideration 
and view the family as a system within a larger legal and social welfare system and the 
implications thereof for not only the family involved, but also the professions themselves. 
It seems that one of the major hurdles in discarding the •either mediation or adversary• debate 
in favour of recognising the historical merits of both these views, in a both/and fashion, lies in 
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the lack of co-operation and the mistrust that have existed between these professions for 
years. It therefore appears to have become a matter ofbattling for the control ofthe definition 
of the problem (Stewart, Valentine & Amundson, 1991 ), the status and expertise of the 
'winning' profession being at stake, at the cost of the other's. 
With divorce and custody recognised as being both personal and legal events, collaboration 
between these professions are implied. In assigning the task of mediation to only one of these 
professions would result in unqualified counselling or inappropriate adjudication in the case of 
a lawyer, or lawful counselling and unauthorised practice oflaw by a mental health worker. 
An interdisciplinary co-mediation team approach is therefore often recommended (Koopman 
& Hunt, 1988; McGee, 1984; Vanderkooi & Pearson, 1983). We are however reminded of 
Auerswald's (1968) warning that insofar as any approach is termed interdisciplinary, it 
maintains the vantage point of each participant within its own discipline, while the interfaces 
between these disciplines are ignored. From this view the image of a third, higher order field 
of study emerges with its own unique body of research p·-d literature, that incorporates both 
legal and behavioural theory and philosophy, and produces professionals schooled in, and 
committed to, both these disciplines. 
CHAPTER3 
An Ecosystemic Epistemology 
"We should remember that the final goal of any science, although probably unobtainable, is 
to achieve a unified theory. In the domain of social science, ecology becomes the broadest 
metaphor to signify such an ideal". (Keeney, 1983, p.l68) 
J 
Theory as Truth Perspective 
Psychotherapists are constructors of reality. Construction 
materials and techniques may be tested - to the extent that 
they are more or less effective in building a certain reality. 
But the reality to be constructed is a matter of sociocultural 
value. Therapists should not expect that outcome studies Will 
spare them the responsibility of taking an epistemological and 
ultimately axiological stand as 1 ) which problems are to be 
faced, how they are to be approached, and in what direction 
the solution is to be attempted. (Colapinto, 1979, p.440) 
The relationship between theory and practice when viewed philosophically, can be said to 
start with the human's search for truth, and it is because of our imperfections and 
limitations that the knowledge of truth is so central to our activities (Rauche, 1990). 
Theories are 'truth perspectives' as they represent our view of the world in tenns of our 
conflict experience of it under specific life and historical circumstances. We therefore only 
know truth-perspectives, constituted from our contingent experience of the world, but 
knowledge of the Truth is not accessible to our understanding. All different types of human 
experience yield different types of knowledge, each methodologically constituted from their 
respective types of human experience. Scientific knowledge is therefore knowledge 
constructed by human beings. As theory (and method) is humanly constructed, no scientific 
theory is conclusive or final,·. but rather problematic and controversial (Rauche, 1990). 
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Theories constituted from our vanous expenences, change, along with the changing 
circumstances of our lives (Lucas, 1985). It therefore follows that as theories are built on 
our changing and variable experience of reality, true freedom of this conflict is never 
attained and the problematic nature of theory never resolved, just as we never attain 
freedom of conflict, changeability and variability in our interactions with each other. It can 
therefore be said that theory and practice are fed from the same source, namely, our 
contingent experience of reality. 
Although it was by no means the first use of the term, Gregory Bateson (Keeney, 1982) 
can be said to be the person to have introduced the term 'epistemology' to the field of 
family therapy. As Keeney puts it, the term epistemology is used more and more by family 
therapists, which accounts for the growing confusion and disagreement about what it really 
means. For that reason I will not attempt to clarify or disentangle this web of meanings, but 
rather give a definition that will coherently facilitate the essential arguments of this study. 
"Epistemology is ... neither a map, description, theory, model, paradigm, nor paradigm of 
paradigms. It is a process of knowing, constructing, and maintaining a world of experience" 
(Keeney, 19f.~ , p.165). Knowing requires drawing distinctions, and drawing distinctions is 
a way of constructing a world, consequently knowing and constructing are recursive and 
inseparable. Joining with a family then becomes a "social construction of a therapeutic 
reality" (Keeney, 1982, p.165) and the activities of diagnosing, intervention and research 
are all recursively linked in a world of created experience. 
A Changing Epistemology 
From this viewpoint it becomes clear that· psychotlierapeutic theory and practice have 
evolved in relation to changing life circumstances and historical conditions, so that now 
too, there seems to be a need for alternatives to current/traditional social thinking, as the 
basis for understanding and practising therapy (Lukas, 1985). This notion is also expressed 
by Colapinto (1979) in an article proclaiming the relative value of empirical evidence. He 
asserts that the value of a particular epistemology lies in its relative efficacy. "An 
epistemology is efficient, i.e., allows for a satisfactory account and handling of 'reality', 
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within a certain sociocultural context and ceases to be so under a different context" 
(p.430). 
Conflict between models or epistemologies are then not resolved by empirical research, 
but rather by sociocultural evolution. If epistemologies in general are truth perspectives, 
and ~pistemologies in the realm of psychotherapy in particular are views on problems and 
their solutio.ns, the sociocultural definition of what constitutes a problem and a solution will 
ultimately determine the efficacy of a particular epistemology. Colapinto (1979) continues 
to explain though that "the relation between sociocultural values and therapeutic 
epistemologies are not a one-way linear process ... " (p.432). 
..· 
To attest this notion he convincingly describes how psychoanalysis developed as a small 
and circumscribed set of clinical situations into a very pervasive number of situations which 
were defined as pathological and in need of treatment -the de.mands of which 
psychoanalysis as an epistemology was unable to cope with. Out of this !paradox' group-, 
. \ 
brief-, and family-therapy models developed to alleviate the need created by psychoanalysis 
( Colapinto, 1979). 
This transition also refers to a very important transition from viewing the locus of 
Rathology as being seated in the individual as exemplified by psychoanalysis, for example, 
to the 'pathology' being found in the rules of the system, as exemplified by the development 
of family therapy and systems thinking. 
Transformations from Old to New 
New science emerged from the study of the 'inanimate' 
universe. The Batesonian evolution emerged from the study 
of the 'living' universe, and .the ecosystems epistemology 
emerged from the study of a segment of the 'living' universe, 
namely families in the context of sociocultural systems ... these 
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three idea sets share the same rules for defining reality, the 
same epistemology. (Auerswald, 1985, p.3) 
Auerswald ( 1985, p. 1) states that a new epistemology - "a new set of rules governing 
thought" -is pervading the "new science", and it differs greatly, and is in fact discontinuous 
with the thought systems of the Western world that has until now occupied centre stage. 
fCurrently, the movement in science is in the direction of holism, ecological 
I 
I interconnectedness and constructivism, away from the traditional ideas of reductionism, 
, :lineal causality and objectivity (Lukas, 1985). This movement represents a new way of 
1 . 
thinking about human behaviour as opposed to another theory of human behaviour -
consequently a new epistemology (Fourie & Lifschitz, 1989). Auerswald (1985) also 
believes that the ecological systems epistemology as evolved from family therapy literature 
is in keeping with the new science epistemology and that "the ecosystems epistemology 
provides the basis for a technology of transformation" (p.2). 
A variety of epistemologies of human behaviour exist A particular contrast between a 
Newtonian epistemology 1· ed in classical physics, and an ecosystemic epistemology 
(Capra, 1982; Fourie & Lifschitz, 1989; Schwartzman, 1984) is found most useful to 
highlight the 'tenets' of an ecosystemic epistemology as described by Keeney (1979). 
In the seventeenth century the nature of science changed coinciding with the work of 
Descartes, who proposed a method for reaching scientific truth. Descartes was famous for 
saying "I think therefore I exist" implying that the essence of human nature lies in thought-
and that for that rationale, certainty can be achieved through intuition and deduction. The 
concept of analytical reasoning or reductionism can consequently be attributed to Cartesian 
philosophy. The ever present 'mind/body problem' also can be credited to the Cartesian 
division of mind and matter - the humanitarian. sciences concentrating on mind and the 
natural sciences on body. This led to the revolutionary change in the image of nature from 
organism to machine, and the mechanisation of science. The mechanistic view of matter 
was also extended to living organisms, and human biology was explained as functioning 
according to the same rules that governed machines. Isaac Newton was however the man 
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who "realised the Cartesian dream and completed the Scientific Revolution" (Capra, 1982, 
p.48). Newton developed a complete mathematical formulation of the mechanistic view of 
nature, synthesising the work of Copernicus, Kepler, Bacon, Galileo and Descartes. "The 
Newtonian universe was, indeed, one huge mechanical system, operating according to 
exact mathematical laws" (Capra, 1982, p.49). Reality is the material world, made up of 
physical objects that adhere to the laws of force and energy. The Newtonian epistemology 
states not only that such an objective external reality exists, but that it can be observed 
objectively. Phenomena can be studied in isolation, by breaking it up into its constitutive 
parts, and then adding them to gain understanding of the whole. Events can be examined as 
if static or fixed in time, and one event can be seen as causative of another - forces acting 
unidirectionally upon others. All events and objects are viewed as independent, and so too 
the observer is seen as independent of that which he or she is observing (Bopp & Weeks, 
1984). 
In the late nineteenth century it was believed that the epistemology for understanding and 
studying physical reality had been perfected through the masterful work of Newton 
,. (Auerswald, 1985), and that his laws could in time also explain that which was L r.. yet 
understood. However, the physicists Planck and Einstein, attempting to explain the 
behaviour of radiation emitted by a heated object, proved it impossible to fit these quantum 
notions with classical concepts, which led to the development ofPlanck's Quantum Theory, 
and Einstein's Theory of Relativity. These can be viewed as the epistemological foundations 
of a new physics, which incorporated notions of a monistic as opposed to a dualistic 
universe, the concept of a four-dimensional timespace as opposed to treating space a~d 
time separately, and a move away from lineal causality between events (Auerswald, 1985; 
1987). 
This transformation from classical to new physics was matched by a similar and equally 
relevant transformation in another field of natural science, namely evolution. Darwin's 
Theory of Evolution was developed during the same time, and consequently reflected the 
same mechanistic worldview as Newtonian physics. Just as the laws of Newtonian 
epistemology could not account for quantum physics, Darwin's famous notion of 'survival 
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of the fittest' remained concrete and did not include the notion of mind as an explanatory 
principle (Bateson, 1979). 
Consciousness or mind is not an entity interacting with 
physical matter, but... IS simply an expressiOn or 
manifestation of the same systemic processes and 
relationships seen in the so-called natural world. Mind is 
neither reducible to or opposed to matter; more accurately, 
mind and matter are seen as facets of a common, universal 
reality. (Lucas, 1985, p.169) 
Gregory Bateson's transformation of Darwinian theory - to create an evolutionary 
paradigm that included mind - was founded on notions derived from systems theory, 
cybernetics and ecology (Keeney, 1983a). 
As seen in the arena of physics and evolution, the new science also developed with 
regards to philosophy and the humanities. EigLt:.;enth century thinkers continued to apply 
the principles ofNewtonian mechanics to the human sciences and human society, namely a 
rational approach to human problems (Capra, 1982). The philosopher, John Locke, 
appeared as the most influential figure in this development, as he created an atomistic view 
of society in which he described it in terms of its most basic elements, namely individuals. 
This entailed a reduction of the patterns observed in society to the behaviour of individuals. 
Locke based his theory of knowledge on the well-known metaphor of the human mind at 
birth as tabula rasa - a blank slate - on which knowledge, acquired through sensory 
experience, is imprinted. This philosophy - of all men being equal at birth - had a strong 
influence on the development of the schools of psychoanalysis and behaviourism, as it 
implied that all development was subject to the environment. Knowledge was seen as 
mental pictures of what was really out there, and the process of knowledge,as a search for 
absolute truth - a realist view (Capra, 1982). 
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This can be contrasted with the teachings of Immanuel Kant (Capra, 1982), who 
emphasised the acquisition of knowledge as an invention as opposed to a discovery. Mental 
images are produced as a function of the interaction between the person and the 
environment - they are then active creations. The Kantian model can therefore be cited as 
the foundation of constructivist theory, which can also be seen as a transformation from 
objectivity of observation (classical science) to the participation of the observer in what is 
observed (new science) (Capra, 1982; Efran, Lukens & Lukens, 1988). 
The two basic theories. of modern physics have thus 
transcended the principal aspects ofthe Cartesian world view 
and of Newtonian physics. Quantum theory has shown that 
subatomic particles are not isolated grains of matter but are 
probability patterns, interconnections in an inseparable 
cosmic web that includes the human observer and her 
consciousness. Relativity theory has made the cosmic web 
come alive, so to speak, by revealing its intrinsically dynamic 
character; by showing that its activity is the very essence of 
its being. In modern physics, the image of the universe as a 
machine has been transcended by a view of it as one 
indivisible, dynamic whole whose parts are essentially 
interrelated and can be understood only as patterns of a 
cosmic process. At the subatomic level the interrelations and 
interactions between the parts of the whole are more 
fundamental than the parts themselves. There is motion but 
there are, ultimately, no moving objects; there is activity but 
there are no actors; there are no dancers, there is only the 
dance. (Capra, 1982, pp.82-83) 
Auerswald ( 198 7) points out that although Newtonian science has lost its predominance 
because its rules are no longer sufficient as a basis for a new epistemology, it remains as a 
paradigm of the new science of epistemology as it is both useful, and because there is no 
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reason to discard it if one accepts the redefinition of truth as heuristic, and if one discards 
dualism. 
If it is assumed that the study of family therapy is partially rooted in science, then the 
emergent ideas of science have relevance for the development of family therapy 
epistemology. The evolution of the study of family therapy is closely linked to events in the 
evolution of the study of biology and physics, a link initially articulated in the writings of 
Bateson (Auerswald, 1987). 
Auerswald (1987, pp.321-322) lists five paradigms that have emerged in the field of 
family therapy since 1959, and states that these all define the family in different terms: 
1. The psychodynamic paradigm defines the family as a "group made up of the 
interlocking psychodynamics of its members who are at various developmental stages". 
2. The family system paradigm defines the family as an independently operating system 
from which individual psychodynamics and those creating .s T!1ptoms, emerge. 
3. A general systems paradigm defining the family as a system that shares the 
characteristics of all other systems, and assumes a position in the "hierarchy" of systems -
higher systems containing lower systems, as sociocultural systems contain family systems, 
and families contain individual systems. 
4. The cybernetic systems paradigm defines any system, including the family, in terms of 
"circular information flow and regulatory mechanisms". 
5. An ecological .~ystems (ecosystemic) paradigm defines a family as a "coevolutionary 
ecosystem located in evolutionary timespace". This paradigm can be said to be rooted in 
the New Science. [It must be pointed out, that 'paradigm' is at a lower level of abstraction 
than 'epistemology' (Auerswald, 1987; Dell, 1985)]. 
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Why Epistemology? 
If one adheres to the notion of constructivism, it would follow that to understand any 
phenomenon or area of study, one should begin by describing how it was constructed -
namely, the distinctions drawn that make up its creation. When it is believed that one 
actively participates in constructing one's experience of the world, the way in which we are 
to perceive the workings of the Office of the Family Advocate, depends on who we are. 
Consequently, to know who I am in this case, is to define my epistemology - the study of 
-..., 
epistemology being "a way of recognizing how people come to construct and maintain their 
habits of cognition" (Keeney, 1983a, p.13). Consciousness is being aware of one's 
epistemology - being able to deconstruct the way in which you have come to see the world. 
The deconstruction implicated in the process of self-awareness, implies a study of people's 
"habitual patterns of punctuation" based on their "epistemological premises for making 
distinctions" (Keeney, 1983a, p.25). 
A Conceptual Framework 
Although essentially an anthropological text, Thornton's (1990) essay entitled Recent 
trend<; in the theory of culture, has general applicability for the social sciences, and proves a 
useful frame within which to re-evaluate the concept of culture or society. 
As ecosystemic thinkers, we would not contradict Thornton's (1990, p.115) contention 
that looking at culture or then any social structure involves looking at '"us' from the point 
of view of 'we"' and finding appropriate ways of doing so. This notion comments on the 
nature of the relationship between the researcher and society or then the observer and the 
observed. Thornton uses the metaphor of the mirror reflecting the researcher/observer 
looking at him or herself, looking at the observed, which in tum reflects the realisation that 
the observer is part of that which he or she observes and the reflexivity necessary for such 
an enterprise to be truly Post-modem. 
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Indeed the most useful frame provided by Thornton (1990) is a differentiation between 
Modem and Post-modem approaches to culture/society which could be equated to the 
distinction between first- and second-order cybernetics (Sluzki, 1985). Modern approaches 
are characterised by "wholes" which are exemplified by timeless "parts" within which 
"function" and "structure", are important, and theory is presented as "schematic and 
categorical" - objectively without the observer entering into the description. The 
achievement of external theory about generalised wholes are in fact paramount in modernist 
approaches to social science phenomena in general (Thornton, 1990, p.116). 
In contrast, Post-modem approaches exposes the Modem conceptions of holism and 
empiricism as illusions, and proposes in turn that the study of culture/society can only be 
"conducted from within culture" which therefore also renders external theory inappropriate, 
while promoting "methods" and "procedures" (process) as a means by which "the ideas and 
resources which constitute culture" can be grasped (Thornton, 1990, p.117). 
Defining the Field of Study 
The Office of the Family Advocate and the activity involved in determining custody of 
children in divorcing or divorced families, can be punctuated as the focus of this study. 
Consequently it is the study of a particular social structure or culture. This domain was 
however traditionally considered a legal or judicial matter. The recognition of the social 
nature of the problem of custody disputes created a role for social science practitioners, 
albeit a subjugated one, in this process (refer to chapter 2 for historical discussion). With 
this in mind, I want to further define the field of study, as the study of the community of 
people (professionals and family members) involved in the process of settling a custody 
dispute. Due to the increasing involvement of psychologists in particular, the relevance of 
this study is readily apparent, as indeed very little has been written about it in South Afiica. 
Historically, the confluence of disciplines and consequent emergence of the structure of 
the Office of the Family Advocate was preceded by a shared perception of the need for 
intervention in a rapidly growing socio-legal problem. In this sense the approach is termed 
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multi-disciplinary. However, in the process of differentiating 'disputed custody' as the 
'problem' to address, it also becomes reductionistic, reified and as a result immobilising. 
Such a view becomes immobilising because it disregards the complexity of family life, 
isolating the symptom of complex interaction and disregarding relationships. We are 
reminded of our definition of epistemology ie. that knowing requires drawing a distiliclion 
which implies constructing a world of experience. Pre-defining the 'problem' to be 
addressed, also constructs it. Furthermore, in defining the roles of each discipline involved 
as distinct and hierarchically ordered, it ignores the interface between them and again 
creates separate categories, which serves to reduce the whole. 
In as early as 1968, Auerswald ( 1968) proposed that an interdisciplinary approach (also 
referred to in this dissertation as a multidisciplinary approach) translates to each discipline 
imposing a singular view on a problem situation, and although it is argued that concepts are 
borrowed from other disciplines which broadens the boundaries of such an outlook, only 
concepts that offer no serious threat to a discipline's worldview are incorporated to 
conceptualise a problem. Auerswald argues that the interface between the conceptual 
frameworks of discipline~ 11 '.re ignored which indeed means that the interface between all 
areas of systemic functioning, represented by the various disciplines, are also ignored. 
Auerswald warns that an interdisciplinary assessment by definition narrows the ecological 
field by focusing on a specific arena of operational life, through the content of the messages 
received. This, he claims, results in "a predetermined template of the theoretical structure 
ofthe dominant discipline" (p.205). 
Adopting an ecosystemic epistemology would be in keeping with Thornton's (1990) 
post-modernist notion of culture or community as a process whereby people's shared ideas 
and interconnectedness are evolved. For this study the i~plications would be twofold: 
1. On one level, an ecosystemic perspective with its emphasis on pattern and relationships 
would serve to focus on the context of interaction among individuals involved and their 
environment (Bechel, 1984) and would constitute the totality of such relationships (Perkel, 
1988). Trickett ( 1984, p.265) defines this as "the community imbeddedness of persons and 
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the nature of communities themselves". In Auerswald's (1968) terms it means taking 
account of the interface between conceptual frameworks of the disciplines involved in 
determining custody as well as the general context of the Office of the Family Advocate. 
According to Auerswald the ecological approach is aimed at the interfaces ofthe arenas of 
operational life and assesses the structure ofthe field, resulting in "an idiosyncratic template 
of the structural and operational configurations" of a particular system (p.205). This also 
implies that such assessment as well as intervention is never limited to a predetermined unit 
such as an individual or family, but could include the school, the church or even an entire 
community. 
A focus on content, arbitrary punctuation of time such as fixed appointments, 
predetermined units of treatment, specialised fields of interest within demarcated disciplines 
and referrals between disciplines are ways in which the ecological field is narrowed down, 
inevitably serving to ignore the interfaces, ultimately resulting in an incomplete look at 
'reality'. 
Taking account of the ecology does not imply universal applicability o '-:alidity, but 
rather refers to a concern for context which Auerswald (1971) defines as "broadening the 
field of enquiry first before narrowing the field" (p.263). 
On this level I will therefore yield a description of the defin.ed field of study, by means of 
the conceptual language provided by an ecosystemic epistemology. 
2. On a different level, I will endeavour to show how mediation may. serve as a 
theory/method, informed by ecosystemic epistemology as meta-theory, in addressing the 
complexity of the stated problem and taking account of the interface between the 
disciplines. This could be seen as an intervention directed at the level of system of the 
family and professionals involved in determining custody. 
Rappaport ( 1981) introduces the concepts of paradox, antimony, dialectic and 
convergent and divergent reasoning in an argument considering the relative value of needs-
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and rights-models of community psychology. He maintains that all social situations and 
problems contain paradox, be it real or false. When a problem poses a real paradox, it is 
because it is made up of real antimonies, such as needs and rights. As I have discussed in 
chapter 2, one of the principal issues in determining custody is looking at the rights of the 
parents while serving the needs of the children. On a different level, it can also be said that 
insofar as the Office of the Family Advocate has been established as a service to the 
community, it is largely based on a needs model, although it contains within it the paradox 
of needs versus rights. This model assumes that the state as parental figure is responsible 
for identifying and providing for the needs of dependent people, unable to resolve their own 
disputes, and create acceptable solutions. The actions that necessarily follow from such an 
assumption are consequently based on the hierarchical roles of the expert/patient and may 
create as many problems as it intends to solve, by ascribing needs to a (geographically 
defined) community that may reflect more about the assumptions of the 'experts' than the 
community they ser\re. (These assumptions often being rooted in a pathology model of 
individual functioning). A further implication of actions based on a needs model would be 
creating a need for service delivery which develops in relation to the learned helplessness 
acquired by families who have been conv r :ed that they need professional intervention. 
Although this has relevance, as it evolved as a result of social circumstances and contextual 
demands, in terms of Rappaport's concept of paradox, responding to need is one-sided in 
approach. 
Responding to the paradox, does however cause a push-pull effect which Rappaport 
( 1981) refers to as the dialectic or dynamic tension between the antimonies. Maintaining 
the dialectic is therefore preferred to becoming one-sided. In Rappaport's view social 
problems are by nature dialectic, and require divergent solutions as opposed to a 
convergent mind-set, producing one single solution. 
This leads to an awareness of the dualistic nature of the arguiTlent presented, which is 
referred to as "either/or dualities" (Keeney, 1983a, p.3). What Rappaport (1981) calls 
one-sidedness is similar to Keeney's notion of accepting only one side of the distinction as 
the truth, or more useful and correct. The needs model is an example of such a dualistic 
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way of drawing distinctions. However, when viewed ecosystemically, these distinctions are 
actually two sides of a complementary relationship, and that in keeping with Rappaport's 
notion of discovering and confronting the paradox would be to "uncover the pattern that 
connect[s] both sides ofthese distinctions" (Keeney, 1983a, p.3). 
Rappaport (1981) proposes an ecological approach to social problems with a symbolic 
sense of urgency (as opposed to security) to embark on the pursuit of paradox, leading to 
the emergence of a variety of contradictory solutions, which should be welcomed as this 
represents a both/and view as opposed to dualistic answers that in themselves create new 
problems. 
Ecosvstemic Epistemology: Aesthetics and Pragmatics 
Bateson, cited in Keeney (1983a, p.190), states that "the truth which is important is not a 
truth of preference, it's a truth of complexity ... of a total ceo-interactive on-going web .. .in 
which we dance, which is the dance of Shiva". 
Uncovering the pattern that connects 
Ecosystemic epistemology (based on cybernetics, ecology and systems theory) is 
proposed by 'Keeney and Sprenkle (1982) and discussed here as a way of framing the 
interface between description and action or aesthetics and pragmatics. Specific 
consideration will be given to the function of language in the relationship between 
epistemology and practice, as well as art and technique in therapy. 
A pragmatic position as defined by Keeney and Sprenkle (1982) involves reducing 
phenomena into manageable bits, therefore simplifying for practical purposes, with a focus 
on utility and outcome, while aesthetics is d.~fined as a move in the opposite direction, with 
a tendency towards holism and complexity - an effort to increasingly grasp the underlying 
patterns that characterise therapeutic contexts. A pragmatist's questions reflect a concern l 
for technical detail, while the aesthetic questions will focus on the patterns of interaction. { 
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From an ecosystemic perspective, both aesthetic and pragmatic questions need to be asked, 
as therapy is seen as an integration of the two. The nature of such integration is contingent 
upon "the form of dialectic between these two juxtaposed patterns" (Keeney & Sprenkle, 
1982, p.3). It should, however, be recognised that these concepts are of different logical 
levels, which implies that mixing these levels would result in confusion. Debating these 
concepts would also remain fruitless as long as each responds from its own level. The 
epistemology that embodies both these concepts would therefore have to "embody two 
identifiable patterns" (p.3): reductionism (pragmatics) and holism (aesthetics), with a 
necessary juxtapositioning between them - therefore an interactive system of description 
and action. 
It has often been asserted from an ecosystemic view that one cannot not have an 
epistemology, and one always acts in accordance with an epistemological frame. In the 
same sense, theory always forms part of one's actions, whether it is from a utility 
perspective (pragmatic concern) or from a concern regarding the importance thereof 
(aesthetics). Notwithstanding the clear distinction between theory and action it is 
consequently evident that a relation exists between the tv (. levels in a way that modifies 
one another. This interaction can be defined as a sensitivity towards theory facilitating less 
harmful therapy or systemic intervention, while an application of useful techniques would in 
turn verify theory and its utility. The dialectic prescribed by Keeney and Sprenkle ( 1982) 
proposes that "the trick and the art lie in the simultaneous influence of epistemology on 
clinical practice and clinical practice on epistemology" (p.6). A recursive influence as 
opposed to lineal effects, between these two patterns, is implied by this interaction. This is 
a more encompassing view than one that emphasises difference, as it aims to respect 
patterns that distinguish as well as connect aesthetics and pragmatics; description and 
action (Keeney, 1982). These distinctions are therefore in the words ofVarela (1976, p.62) 
"not one, not two". 
Saying that ecosystemic epistemology embraces an interactional as opposed to a lineal 
view implies a logic of negation - a distinction within which one side is chosen as more 
correct than the other. As a consequence aesthetics and pragmatics also are interpreted as a 
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distinction between experiential or strategic therapy (Keeney, 1982). These should, 
however, be reframed as related through the logic of complementarity, which implies that 
within a circular or recursive epistemology it may be equally convenient and appropriate at 
times to think in terms of a lineal hypothesis or a pragmatic concern. 
In terms of this dissertation, it implies being sensitive to the assumptions of my 
epistemological stance (thinking about my thinking) while describing patterns in the field of 
study. 
Technique as intervention 
The discussion of the dialectic between aesthetics and pragmatics has important 
implications in terms of viewing technique or intervention. In this regard, Allman (1982), 
Keeney (1983a) and Keeney and Sprenkle (1982) distinguish between technique and art. 
Concern over clinical practice leads to a specification of techniques, while concern over the 
coupling of techniques with the system being treated as well as the ecologies both are part 
of, is a concern fm •i rt. Thi~ encompasses the second-order cybernetic view of the therapist 
being part of the system b~ing treated (or the observer being part of the observed), while a 
concern for techniques is a view of the therapist outside of the system. 
' 
Art is to technique as authenti~ experience is to simulation (Keeney & Sprenkle, 1982), 
yet artistry in therapy is reducible to basic technique and method. Becoming an artist is 
therefore addressing the dialectic between ae~thetics and pragmatics (Keeney, 1982). 
Technique viewed from the perspective of pragmatics is referred to as conscious purpose 
(Allman, 1982; Keeney, 1983a) and does not take the whole ecological context into 
account, which may lead to higher order problems. "From this perspective, problems only 
arise when our technique is not adequately tempered by higher orders of cybernetic 
processu (Keeney, 1983a, p.188). It merely addresses the short arcs and has little regard for 
interlocking circuits of life within systems. Working without sensitivity to aesthetics may 
consequently be seen as a way of perpetuating pathology. 
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"I believe that action, if it be planned at all, must always be planned upon an aesthetic 
base" (Bateson cited in Keeney, 1983a, p.187). This refers to art rooted in aesthetics, 
where practice is focused on growth of oneself and other and effecting higher-order change 
or change of epistemology. 
The implication for intervention is that techniques from a pragmatic frame are designed to 
alleviate symptomatic relief in a shorter timespan, but may induce other forms of pathology 
as a result ofbeing insensitive to the wider ecology ofwhich such problems are part. These 
concepts therefore also hold implications for the perception of change, as from an aesthetic 
base for technique, change is connected to a broader time-frame requiring patience for 
change, and in fact moves away from a pre-occupation with change towards experiential 
awareness and respect for ecology. What is needed for an aesthetic base for intervention is 
responsibility on the part of therapists for the contextualisation of their techniques, and the 
coupling thereof to higher orders of mental process, namely 'unconscious' orders of mind 
(Allman, 1982; Keeney, 1983a). Conscious and unconscious orders of mind need therefore 
be recursively connected as "parts of self-corrective feedback" (Keen,~; 1983a, p.189). 
Technique is consequently organised as a complementary part in a broader ecosystem. With 
regard to intervention, Keeney ( 1983 a,/p~T94) states: ( 
\ 
In this interactive daQ_ce, a whole pattern of organisation 
rather than conscious intent on purpose triggers action. 
Sociofeedback in therapy also demonstrates this process. 
Here, a whole pattern of cycled transforms triggers change, 
rather than the conscious purpose of the individual. 
The observer and observed or therapist and system become recursively connected 
through feedback, and the therapy becomes a road to second-order change through the 
uncovering and construction of patterns that connect. 
-~--------
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However, in order to become an artist requires the continual practice of skill or 
technique, and therapy. is the context for such practice, with -a view to the therapist's 
epistemological change (Allman, 1982), which would make of him or her an artist as 
opposed to a technician - so that the patient study and application of technique begin to 
coalesce into a meaningful pattern (Keeney, 1983a). Artistry implies the search for pattern 
rather than truth - how a variety of different descriptions fit together, rather than which 
description is more correct Such a stance is also referred to as a state of 'neutrality' which 
is best described as a state of'curiosity'. Actions towards a system based on curiosity about 
different descriptions and the pattern of such relationships are defined as neutral (Cecchin, 
1987). 
In terms of this study, the application of professional skill and technique sees the 
technicians (all the professionals involved in a custody case) as outside of the system being 
treated. Consequently again, skill practised from the vantage point of each discipline 
Ignores the interface between disciplines (Auerswald, 1968), and precludes a second 
higher -order awareness of the process of intervention in families in crisis, which may serve 
to perpetuate the problem. ,_ 
The nature of language 
The interface between the therapist's/observer's epistemology and practice is mediated by 
means of the language of the therapist/observer (Keeney & Sprenkle, 1982). The nature of 
this explanatory language (Papp, 1982) used both in the process of therapy and for means 
of post hoc description, inevitably leads to some form of dualism as it is structured in a way 
that reduces the world into nameable parts. Ecosystemic epistemology (as discussed above) 
is committed to the recognition of complete circuits and whole ecologies, implying a 
non-dualistic conceptualisation. However, by virtue of the said nature of explanatory 
language one is continually stuck in a dualistic frame - everything can have meaning only in 
terms of its own opposite. In order to become unstuck, a dialectic challenging the dualisms 
of language is proposed that continually disentangles each linguistic frame. Yet one cannot 
fully escape dualistic framings, usmg Western language. In this sense, ecosystemic 
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epistemology attempts to translate reified nouns into forms of language that describe 
relationship and process, and attempt to continuously challenge its own assumptions which 
is inevitably cast in dualistic explanatory language. However, figurative language (Papp, 
1982) has a tendency to synthesise and combine levels of thought and action into a more 
holistic picture, providing a more circular perspective. The use of such figurative language 
therefore results in techniques such as the use of metaphor, imagery, narrative, and 
story-telling that are in keeping with the ecosystemic commitment to holism and synthesis, 
that highlight relationship and process. 
"Metaphors provide a complete gestalt in which dissociated facts and events can be seen 
in relation to one another". The richness of the symbols and imagery which it provides, 
gives rise to complexity which forms a "link between perceptions, behaviour and 
interaction" (Papp, 1982, p.454). 
It has repeatedly been stated that in order to address the dialectic between aesthetics and 
pragmatics or description and action, it is necessary to uncover the pattern that connects 
these complementarities. One such way includes Bateson's ( 1979) principle of f. Juble 
description, which requires a view .of .relationship juxtaposed from multiple perspectives 
(Penn, 1982) and generates holistic information about process and relationship as members 
of a system punctuate the flow of interaction (Keeney, 1983b ). It means that the 
simultaneous combination of everyone's punctuations provide a glance at the whole 
interactive system. Double description can consequently also be seen as a way of using 
language to "direct us towards higher order description" (Keeney, 1983a, p.38) in spite of 
~he structural constraints of our language. Circular questioning, developed by the Milan 
Associates, can be seen as a technique of double description, as it exemplifies how the 
notions of circularity and co-evolutionary change (Penn, 1982) is put to practice. It 
represents a way of looking at the patterns that connect, and refers to feedback from the 
family or system based on information obtained about relationships and change, whic~. 
represents arcs bet~een past and present, or how a problem is connected across time. The 
relations discerned by means of double description or circular questioning, could be 
discussed in terms of logical typing and the dialectic between form and process. 
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Bateson (1979) defines 'aesthetic' as being responsive to the pattern that connects. As 
mentioned, the communicational world or world of language is structured in terms of 
difference, and the structure of this world is characterised by logical typing which involves 
levels of description, categories of description, epistemologies of description etc. Logical 
typing is the discrimination of levels of communication. It suggests the hierarchical 
structure of experience, and such hierarchy is recursively structured - our distinctions are 
always distinctions drawn upon distinctions. Orders of recursion also refer to logical typing, 
and it is the task of an epistemologist to mark the orders of recursion invoked in any given 
description. 
Logical typing resembles a hierarchical ladder of how to think about the pattern which 
connects, implying that the pattern which connects is a meta-pattern. With the notion of 
logical typing, there is a logical distinction between the observation and the phenomena 
observed, or the description and the phenomena described, which has the nature of 
classification (Bateson, 1979). When information is mapped according to the hierarchy of 
logical types, it becomes a zig-zag ladder or dialectic between form and process, which 
d1 ;nonstrates Bateson's recursive approach to epistemology. 
Description of process refers to the observer's punctuation of the stream of events, based 
on sensory experience, practically devoid of theoretical abstractions. The left side of the 
ladder is called classification of form. This refers to naming the patterns that organise each 
order of description, namely simple action, interaction and choreography. Classification of 
form is therefore an abstraction that connects the elements of each order of description 
together in a meaningful way. 
To move from one order of description to another requires a double description. The idea 
is that the interplay between two views of the same logical type results in a view of a higher 
logical type. 
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This way of punctuating the stream of events and naming the patterns that emerge 
correspond to particular orders of recursion which are related to the distinctions drawn by 
the observer (Bateson, 1979). Describing and classifying simple actions involves the order 
of distinction of behaviour. The identification of the categories of action leads to the 
analysis of context, which is the next order of recursion, based on the information 
generated from the previous level. These contexts themselves are subject to a higher order 
organisation, namely meta-context. 
The distinction of the dialectic between form and process is therefore between description 
of sensory experience and typology or categorisation of such description. Bateson ( 1979) 
points out that this ladder represents a typology of process. 
Therefore, to tie this to the notion oflogical typing Bateson '(1979) states that ifwe start 
to map real events onto the hierarchies of the paradigm of logical typing, we do not find 
only a list of classes, classes of classes and classes of classes of classes, but it also becomes 
a zig-zag ladder of dialectic between form and process. 
Keeney (1987) and Keeney and Ross (1992) have adap~..;d the notion ofform and process 
into a formal way of understanding the construction of systemic therapeutic realities. This 
system of clinical notation demonstrates a way of understanding the construction of 
therapeutic realities and encompasses the dialectic between description and action, mapped 
on hierarchical orders of recursion that include behaviour at the bottom; the interactional 
context; and social ecology ~t the top. Based on Bateson's ( 1979) zig-zag ladder of form 
and process, Keeney (1987) and Keeney and Ross (1992) propose the management of 
semantics and politics - semantics being the construction of meanings synonymous to 
description and politics being the specification of action - all within a communicational 
frame. 
In terms of intervention, the therapist introduces new semantics, or political action that 
may be addressed on the level of behaviour or interaction and that may give rise to new 
semantic labels or meaning. 
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Intervention in this way is aimed at creating new meaning (challenging semantic labels) 
which may have political consequences which may challenge further meaning, or it may be 
aimed at effecting political change (action) in order to give rise to new meaning ascribed to 
action, and so on. Insofar as any technique may be used in order to challenge meaning (for 
example, narrative, stories, fables, metaphor, double description or circular questioning), 
and any technique may be used to change action (for example, ritual, role play, sculpting 
and individual presentation of metaphor), the notation of form and process or semantics 
and politics is not a technique of intervention in itself, but rather a way of making sense of 
the process of intervention and change. 
In becoming "an artist of therapy ... a starting point is practice" (Keeney, 1983a, p.199). 
We are reminded of the dialectic between description and action; aesthetics and pragmatics 
which makes us conscious of the wider ecology of which people and symptoms are a part, 
and the patterns that connect these. We are therefore not practising a skill to become 
technicians, effecting rapid change, but artists, concerned with epistemological and 
higher-order change. In this interactive dance of description and action - the "dance of 
Shiva" (Keeney, '·. 983a, p.198), a "whole pattern of organisation rather than conscious 
intent or purpose triggers action" (p.194) through the process of circularity and social 
feedback. 
When therapy is seen as a vehicle for epistemological 
change ... a therapist who is part of such a learning context 
will eventually experience his world in a profoundly different 
way - he will have learned to discern and construct patterns 
that connect (Keeney, 1983a, p.195). 
CHAPTER4 
The Methodology - Descriptions of Descriptions 
To model the human studies entirely on the sciences is, I 
believe, intellectually misguided, scientifically sterile, and 
morally dangerous. It is misguided because it ignores or 
misconstrues familiar cognitive processes; sterile because it 
does not yield the knowledge we need; and dangerous 
because it fosters the conception of man as something else in 
the world which can be manipulated. (Rickman, 1967, p.l31) 
The aforementioned reference to 'the sciences' refers to the Newtonian tenets of 
reductionism, lineal causality and neutral objectivity in research. Such an epistemology 
stresses that the observer be impartial and objective, and that values and beliefs held by the 
observer biases the truth; that reality can be broken into concrete and discrete units by 
means of which it can l,t observed; and that discrete events are causally linked, flowing 
from past to present (Holland, 1991; Schwartzman, 1984). Holland (1991, p.33) states, 
however, that "neither the phenomena of human consciOusness nor the realities of 
professional practice conform to the ontological assumptions and methodological 
requirements of the scientific method". Pragmatically such realities of professional practice 
often include questions of ethical choice and moral responsibility, rendering empirical 
methods useless. Aesthetically, the richness, complexity and depth ofthe human experience 
is largely sacrificed when adhering to a scientific empirical methodology as eloquently 
expressed by Laing, cited in Capra (1982, p.40): 
Out go sight, sound, taste, touch and smell and along with 
them has since gone aesthetics and ethical sensibility, values, 
quality, form; all feelings, motives, intentions, soul, 
consciousness, spirit. Experience as such is cast out of the 
realm of scientific discourse. 
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In essence we are therefore reminded of the value of context and meaning (Riessman, 
1991 ). Human reality rather than being a series of discrete events can be described as 
clusters of meaning in constant transformation as a result of our interaction with our 
environment, such interaction providing for context without which words and actions have 
no meaning (Bateson, 1979). In the context of an ecosystemic epistemology this implies 
that each system is unique in terms of its observable characteristics or sets of relations, and 
more importantly, that the meanings ascribed to such characteristics and relations are 
idiosyncratic to that system. Research would therefore be a description ofthe change in the 
relations as a system interacts with its environment. An ecosystemic perspective would 
invite a 'polyphonic orientation' to the description of interaction in recognising the 
complexity of interaction. This would mean abandoning trying to find a 'true' explanation, 
but rather generating multiple descriptions within a frame of 'curiosity' so as to build a more 
systemic view. If we are curious, we act towards the system in the way that is truly neutral 
(Cecchin, 1987). 
Reference as made above to interaction, relationship, context and meaning vJ> J form the 
basis of this proposed description-as-research from a frame of curiosity or neutrality as 
proposed by Cecchin ( 1987) and Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin and Prata (1980). In order to 
arrive at such a description we are reminded of double description as discussed in chapter 
3. "Seeing relationship requires double description" (Keeney, 1983a, p.37). 
In this regard, White and Epston (1990, p.3) refer to the "interpretive method", as the 
process by which we make sense of the world and how the meanings we ascribe to events 
determine our behaviour. Meaning is again recursively linked to consciousness or knowing 
our epistemology. White and Epston (1990, p.5) also refer to the "analogies" or maps by 
which social science examines the world. Positivism can be identified as being one such 
analogy. Adhering to cybernetic logic, it therefore also follows that the analogy employed, 
constructs reality in a peculiar way, as positivism would construct the world in discreet 
observable units with definite causal links from one to the other. 
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An alternative analogy frequently proposed is that of narrative analysis or the analogy of 
text (Holland, 1991; White & Epston; 1990). "Behaviour is seen through the analogy of a 
story that the person is telling about what he/she is doing and how such tasks and 
experiences are organized into a meaningful whole" (Holland, 1991, p.33). 
At this point the reader is once again reminded of the 'aim' of this study with a view to 
describing how these aims will be arrived at, constituting a methodology, namely: a 
description of the patterns ofinteraction between the systems involved in a case of disputed 
custody within the context of the Office of the Family Advocate in Pretoria, primarily by 
means of the participant observation in a single case, over time. 
Given Bateson and Keeney's emphasis on double description and logical typing as means 
of seeing patterned events, the nature of the information to be presented will be 
metacommunicational. 
Information was gathered over time (Sept. 1993 -Dec. 1994) by means of: 
Participant observation in a 'mediation' session with all systems involved. 
Participant observation in an unstructured evaluation session involving the children 
in dispute. 
Unstructured interviews or discussions with the individual systems involved 
regarding the process. 
An analysis of all documentation involved in this single case, as secondary source. 
Similar methods of assessing families involved with larger systems, as proposed by 
Coppersmith (1983) and Imber-Black (1988), are adapted and used as a framework for the 
ordering of the information obtained into .a descriptive whole of metadescriptions, involving 
the following: 
1. A description of the systems involved both directly and indirectly including helping 
professions, agencies, legal representatives, the family and myself. Such a description 
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would also make reference to the nature of their or my involvement. Coppersmith (1983, 
p.87) asserts that such information "provide[s] the skeletal features of an ecosystemic 
map". 
2. A description of the way in which the problem is being defined by all the systems 
involved which would also reflect the worldview to which each subscribes, and the way in 
which these interact to form the process that is a 'custody case'. 
3. A description of the nature of the relationships between systems such as between the 
family and professionals, between helping professions, between myself and other systems 
and so on. 
4. A description of my own manner of assessment of this process between myself, the 
family and larger systems in terms of the concept of 'neutrality'. This denotes a meta-level 
position in a bid to detriangulate and be "allied with everyone and no one at the same time" 
(Palazzoli et al., 1980, p.11 ). Neutrality also refers to generating descriptions "within a 
i lame of curiosity rather than within a frame of true and false explanations" (Cecchin, 1987, .i 
p.407) and therefore to looking at patterns rather than cause-and-effect. 
. 
5. A description of the process of gathering information of a metacommunicational nature 
in terms of the concept of 'circularity' (Palazzoli et a!., 1980). This refers to the gathering 
of information of a relational nature, by soliciting information of difference or change, 
implying pattern rather than fact. 
The demarcation of descriptions in such a way constitutes an idiosyncratic punctuation of 
information that is recursively linked and through which discernable patterns are sought to 
emerge, which implies an aesthetic frame. 
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According to Keeney (1983c). ecological assessment, which can be said to define the 
methodology of this study, requires gaining access to information on the levels of a) 
individual behaviour; b) social relationships or dyadic interaction, and c) social group 
structures. 
An awareness of the levels of system aimed at in assessment is termed by Keeney (1983c, 
p.l59) as an "ecological awareness". In essence this means that inferences about dyadic or 
system functioning cannot be made through assessment of individuals (Filsinger, McAvoy 
& Lewis, 1982). Information about whole relationships could, however, be obtained by 
means of double descriptions which would yield information regarding an individual's 
perceptions of interaction. On the part of the investigator this implies the use of descriptive 
language corresponding to the level of system being assessed. A relationship ensues from 
two descriptions of different points of view (De Shazer, 1983). Descriptions of interaction, 
that is, double-descriptions can therefore allow one to make inferences about the relation 
of one level of system to other levels of system. 
Such a view corresponds with Bateson's ( 1979) theory of logical typing characterised by 
a zig-zag ladder of dialectic between descriptions of process and classification of form as 
discussed in chapter 3. 
With regard to the ordering of data, an ecological awareness inspires a "synchronic" or 
nonlineal perspective, derived from cybernetics, whereby bits of description are organised 
into a "present-state circular description" (Keeney, 1983c, p.l64) in an attempt to reflect 
the wholeness of an interacting system which is pattern. The nature of the information 
obtained in this study is in the form of narrative, which Riessman ( 1991) contends, is 
organised around circular rather than lineal time, as past experience and future possibilities 
are collapsed into present meaning. 
CHAPTERS 
Disputed Custody - A Case Study 
Descriptions of the Svstems Involved 
The Family System 
(No real names were used, in order to protect the identity of the people involved.) 
Jaco Conradie, the biological father and "Applicant" in this case, is a 32-year-old, 
Mrikaans-speaking male who has been married twice, and is living in Pretoria with his three 
children. Although currently divorced, it would seem that he is living with a girlfriend. At 
the time of his application for custody, he was also unmarried and living with his mother, 
Mrs Lorraine Odendaal, who was instrumental in his application for custody of her 
grandchildren. 
Sandra Kruger (previously Conradie) also known as the "Respondent11 is the mother of 
the children in question. She is a 32-year-old female brought up in a dual-medium home, 
and lives in a small town in Natal. She was also living there at the time of the application 
for custody by Jaco Conradie. 
The children born from the marriage between Jaco and Sandra, and around whom the 
issue of custody arose, are Anzee Conradie (now aged 10) and the identical twins 
Christopher and Colin Conradie (now aged 8). The children lived with their mother, 
Sandra, stepfather and half-siblings, Sharon and Shane Kruger (now aged 5 and 3 years 
respectively), until the time of their father's application for custody in July 1993. 
The stepfather, Sandra's husband, is Karel Kruger, a 29-year-old, Afrikaans male who is 
also the biological father of Sharon and Shane Kruger. At the time of Jaco Conradie's 
52 
application for custody of the three Conradie-children, Karel was the sole breadwinner and 
supporting Sandra and the 5 children, working as an operator for a paper mill. 
Jaco and Sandra were married in 1983 and divorced in 1987. Control and custody ofthe 
minor children (Anzee, Christopher and Colin) were awarded to Sandra. In 1989 Sandra 
married Karel and moved to Natal. Until that time, contact existed between Jaco and his 
children. However, Jaco also remarried in 1989. His new wife was not eager to 
accommodate his children from his previous marriage which did not promote contact. Jaco 
seemed to have accepted this and had no contact with them. According to Sandra, he also 
did not pay maintenance during that time. Jaco's mother, Mrs Odendaal, did however have 
contact with her grandchildren during this time. In 1991 Jaco obtained a divorce from his 
second wife. 
The first real contact he had with his children again, was during the July school holidays 
in 1992. Sandra claims that this renewed interest came about as a result of her suing for 
maintenance. According to Sandra the twins, then aged 5, met their father then for the first 
time. Anzee, although she had not seen him for some years, could remember hi.'". The 
school holiday went well, and the children returned to their mother for the new term. An 
incident arose some months later, however, in which Anzee claimed, by way of telling a 
friend, that she was sexually molested while in Pretoria. (The children were said to have 
been left in a park while their grandmother, Mrs Odendaal, went shopping. A man allegedly 
touched her in an inappropriate manner.) Sandra informed the school teacher of this, in 
order to obtain the services of the school psychologist. Anzee was enlisted in a sexual 
educ3:tion discussion group at the school where it was felt that she was not significantly 
traumatised and no therapy was therefore indicated. Some confusion resulted from this 
incident, with Jaco and his mother denying that this could have occurred in Pretoria, and 
alleging that it happened in Natal. Karel was considered the perpetrator, by them. 
The children came to Pretoria again for the July holidays of 1993. According to Jaco 
they were only due to come for the December holidays of that year. Sandra was said to 
have phoned Jaco's mother, insisting that he had to take them for the July holidays or not at 
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alL Jaco went to fetch them, and initially all went well. Mrs Odendaal, Jaco's mother, was 
looking after them during this holiday. According to her and Jaco, the children started 
acting 'strangely', approximately a week before they were due to return home. They were 
apparently wetting their beds, displayed a significant loss of appetite, and became listless. 
According to Jaco and his mother, they said that they did not want to return home because 
they did not get enough food, and were often beaten by their stepfather. There were 
specific allegations of them being slapped through the face, and the twins having had their 
heads knocked together. It was also thought that Anzee was acting inappropriately towards 
the boys in the ·sense that she was mothering them. Questioning Anzee around this, 
allegedly also revealed that she was responsible for the physical care of her younger 
half-siblings at home, and had to get up excessively early in the morning in order to finish in 
time for school. It would seem that it was mainly Mrs Odendaal who extracted this 
information from the children, as she was with them all day while Jaco was at work. She 
would then inform Jaco every night when he got home of what had transpired with the 
children that day. 
As a result of these allegations, Jaco took the . '' ildren to a private psychologist A, who 
after having spoken to them, felt that they should not be returned to their mother's home. 
Jaco could, however not afford her report and was referred to another psychologist B, who 
evaluated the children psychometrically, and recommended that they remain in the care of 
Jaco and his mother. 
Jaco immediately enroled the children at the primary school in his area. Anzee, who was 
in Std 1 then, is said to . have adapted quickly. The twins, Christopher and Colin, 
experienced problems and had to be evaluated by the school psychologist C, who 
recommended that they be placed in a remedial school because of serious learning 
disabilities. She also recommended that they be evaluated neurologically. 
According to Sandra, she was never informed that the children would not be returning 
after the school holidays, and only discovered the reasons for this when she went to lay a 
charge of kidnapping. She described it as having been a tremendous shock, and believes 
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that this whole thing was orchestrated by Mrs Odendaal in order to have the children with 
her, as she had been trying to convince Sandra for years to move back to Pretoria so that 
she could have her grandchildren near her. Sandra denied allegations of the children not 
having had enough to eat, or having been physically abused by Karel. She described him as 
a good father, who helped her raise the children as his own. She indicated in interviews that 
there had been disciplinary problems with the children, as the twins were 'impossible' and 
Anzee was difficult in the sense that she was a sensitive child. She also indicated that Karel 
was very strict, and preferred corporal punishment as a means of disciplining. She said that 
she had been aware of the twins' learning difficulties as they were assessed by the school 
psychologist in Natal as well. Although she was at times uncertain about the handling of the 
children, and preferred to leave the disciplining in Karel's hands, she never believed that 
they were incompetent parents or acting to the children's detriment. 
Guided by his mother, Jaco believed that he was acting in the best interest of his children, 
and felt it his responsibility towards them to apply for the amendment of the custody order. 
Mrs Odendaal reacted on the information she had obtained from the children, as she had 
been very close ~ .o them, especially Anzee, who confided in her regularly. Sandra 
considered herself close to her children, and thought that although they suffered financially 
and experienced problems with the children, she was shocked by the extreme turn of 
events. Although Karel complained about the naughtiness of especially the twins, and 
admitted that he frequently had to give them hidings, he felt upset about the allegations 
made against him, especially in the light of Jaco never having taken an interest in the 
children before. Karel saw them as his own, as he had supported them financially for all the 
years when Sandra received no maintenance. The children themselves were very 
traumatised during that time. Their ambivalence became clear in the way in which they 
exhibited strong emotional ties with their mother, while expressing a preference to live with 
their father. 
On July 27, 1993 an application for amendment of custody and control as specified in the 
divorce ruling, was made by Jaco, and an interim order gave him custody pending a 
complete inquiry by the Office of the Family Advocate. 
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The Office of the Family Advocate 
Jaco and Mrs Odendaal were first seen by the family advocate and his family counsellor 
(a social worker A) on 11 August 1993. Sandra was in Natal and informed the Office ofthe 
Family Advocate that she could not afford to travel up. As a result, the assistance of the 
Department ofWelfare in Natal was enlisted in obtaining a social worker's report on Sandra 
and Karel, with regard to custody of the children in question. Such a report was supplied, 
and placed the Kruger parents in a favourable light. However, Sandra later informed the 
office that she would make the trip to Pretoria, and a meeting with all the parties was 
scheduled for September 8, 1993, especially with a view to mediating the dispute. 
Specifically, the meeting was attended by: Jaco Conradie; Mrs Odendaal; Sandra Kruger; 
Karel Kruger; Anzee, Christopher and Colin Conradie; the family advocate; the social 
worker A; a psychologist D, consulting for the family advocate, and myself 
The parties were not seen together. Jaco and his mother were interviewed first, Sandra 
next, and Karel after her. The children were also seen on their own ··\iy myself, the 
psychologist D and the social worker A. A separate assessment of the children was also 
done on September 23, 1993, by the psychologist D. The psychological report from 
psychologist B was also entered and referred to as information, but it was the opinion of 
the panel that independent evaluations of the children were necessary, by someone who had 
seen the whole family. 
Based on the above-mentioned information obtained, reports were compiled by both the 
social worker A and the psychologist D. This process culminated in a final report compiled 
by the family advocate in which recommendations for the custody of and access to the 
children were made to the court. 
The role and function of the family advocate is clearly defined by Chief Family Advocate 
Francis Bosman (1992; 1994) and the following description represents a summary thereof 
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It coincides with my own expenence of the procedures at the Office of the Family 
Advocate: 
A description of the role and function of the family advocate must be viewed in terms of 
the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act, 24 of 1987 which came into operation on 
October 1, 1990 with the institution of the Office of the Family Advocate, which in turn 
can be seen to have resulted from the recommendations of the Hoexter Commission's 
Report some years earlier (chapter 2 refers) (Bosman, 1992; 1994). 
The role of the family advocate as defined by the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters 
Act is that of representing the minor child in the Supreme Court and providing a service to 
the Supreme Court which in turn empowers the family advocate to initiate an inquiry into 
matters concerning the welfare of minor or dependent children. "Intercession by the Family 
Advocate occurs only after action or application; (a) by order of Court; (b) at the request 
of the parties; or (c) on the initiative of the F amity Advocate authorized by the Court" 
(Bosman, 1994, p.3). 
Bosman (1992; 1994) defines the function of the family advocate as threefold, namely 
monitoring, evaluating and mediating. These functions are generally integrated especially in 
the case of an inquiry being initiated by the family advocate. Monitoring refers to the 
scrutiny of all court documents regarding divorce and post-divorce applications involving 
the welfare of children. On the request of the family advocate, the court may authorise an 
inquiry, which generally results in a fact-finding inquiry upon which a report with a 
recommendation regarding the minor children is compiled. Monitoring then also includes 
reviewing of all settlement agreements as well as unopposed divorce actions upon request 
of the court in order to ensure that the welfare of the children is paramount. 
In the case where a dispute exists b~tween the parties regarding the children or the. 
advocate disagrees with the settlement reached by the parties with regard to the 'best 
interest of the children' principle, an evaluation may be deemed necessary, as happened in 
the case of Conradie v Kruger. In this regard the family advocate is assisted by family 
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counsellors and they should in terms of the Act be suitably qualified. In practice these 
counsellors consist mostly of social workers, although volunteer professionals (suitably 
qualified) may also be used. Such counsellors form an integral part of both the mediation 
and evaluation functions within the Office of the Family Advocate. The procedure to be 
followed with such an inquiry instituted by the family advocate, is also considered at the 
discretion of the family advocate. 
Despite its title the Mediation in Certain Divorce matters Act does not define mediation. 
The way in which mediation however has been developed is defined by Bosman (1992, 
p.57) as: 
an alternative dispute resolution mechanism ... [and] a 
dynamic process whereby the family advocate in a 
atmosphere where conflict is reduced to a minimum, actively 
encourages the parties to participate in a discussion seeking a 
mutually acceptable solution in regard to matters pertaining 
to the children. 
This is considered especially applicable in cases where guardianship, custody or access is 
disputed. Bosman (1992; 1994) does, however, stress that mediation by the family 
advocate differs from mediation commonly viewed, although this will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 6. 
In the case of disputed custody and/or access the procedure generally followed is outlined 
by Bosman (1992; 1994) to be as follows: 
1. The parties including the children and any other relevant family or significant others are 
invited to attend an inqiJiry at the Office ofthe Family Advocate. 
2. The procedure and stance of the Office of the Family Advocate is explained to all 
concerned, that is, the principle of best interest of the child; the reason for the inquiry and 
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the roles of everyone involved, and the neutral stance adopted by all experts. Throughout 
the family advocate acts as chairperson of the proceedings. 
3. If possible, the parties may then be interviewed individually by the team "and relevant 
disputes of law and fact outlined" (Bosman, 1994, p.IO). Parties therefore have the 
opportunity to express their views for and against custody and access individually, and 
opposing views of one is put to the other. 
4. An interview is then conducted with the children by either the family counsellor or 
both the counsellor and family advocate, after which another joint session with the parties is 
held. "The family advocate puts the prima facie impression of the mediation team to the 
parties for discussion and possible agreement" (Bosman, 1992, p. 59). If agreement cannot 
be reached, further investigation is indicated. This happens especially in cases where the 
psychological wellbeing of either parents or children are questioned and calls for a 
psychological evaluation of the whole family. 
In the sessions in which I took part, it was explained to fv~:: parties at the outset, that the 
session was an opportunity for everyone to state their case, although not a context for 
cross-questioning as in court, and that it was the role of the advocate and other 'experts', as 
we were defined, to adopt a neutral stance, therefore not choosing the side of any parent. It 
was further explained, that the team was exclusively concerned with the interests of the 
children involved. It was explained that the grounds for divorce were only'to be discussed if 
it had direct relevance with regard to the children. The facts obtained in this way, would 
result in a report which would serve as a recommendation, not an order, as such an order 
may only be made by a judge. It was made clear that the contents of such a report is never 
arbitrary, but instead is drawn up according to entrenched legal principles and the principles 
of expert theory. The guidelines for such a report are also determined by the judge. 
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Myself 
I became involved in the workings of the Office of the Family Advocate and the 
Conradie/Kruger family, as a direct result of my interest in this field of study and my 
proposal for this dissertation. 
In turn, my interest in this field of study is of a more personal nature, having been a child 
from divorced parents. Although I never experienced any part of my own parent's divorce 
as traumatic, probably due to my parents taking great care in handling the matter in a 
sensitive and responsible manner, and although no heated arguments and dramatic battles 
for custody ever took place, as a child I was always aware of the most subtle and unspoken 
interpersonal violence, hence my own fear of conflict or even confrontation, and an endless 
need to mediate. 
I was introduced to Advocate Francis Bosman in August 1993, by Dr Yvonne von den 
Worm (at that time, a consulting psychologist for the family advocates, and a Unisa 
lecturer) during which • ~eeting I was granted permission to be a participant observer in a 
custody case for the purpose of using this as a case study for my dissertation. Selection of 
the case was to be determined by the staff of the office and myself, provided the family 
members concerned gave their explicit consent. 
It was agreed that the Conradie v Kruger case was suitable for my purpose. On the day of 
the initial interview with the family, I was introduced to them by the family advocate and 
their consent was obtained. Before having met them, I was given the opportunity to sit in 
on another case, in order to obtain an understanding of the way in which this office 
operated, and the processes involved in a custody enquiry. 
In both cases my role was defined as being a Master's student in Psychology and part of 
the panel of family experts along with the social worker and consulting psychologist. My 
attendance and participation was also noted in the final report drawn up by the family 
advocate. My participation was readily received by the family advocates, and it was my 
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impression that both the advocates and social workers relied significantly on the input from 
consulting psychologists. Interaction between the professionals appeared relaxed and 
informal, although sessions between both families and professionals assumed a more formal 
structure. Such sessions were invariably lead by the family advocate who functioned as 
chairperson of the proceedings. 
My initial contact with the Conradie/Kruger family was only at the Office of the Family 
Advocate, between September 1993, at the time ofthe inquiry, and November 1993, when 
the final recommendation was made. Subsequent contact was at my own initiative and 
mainly by telephone. This occurred in the period October to December 1994. Although 
Jaco Conradie gave his consent for my participation in this case, I could not trace him for 
the follow-up interview in October 1994, and a message from him through Sandra Kruger 
indicated that he did not wish to take part in this study any more, as the children "have been 
through enough". Contact with the Office ofthe Family Advocate in the form offollow-up 
interviews with the family advocate and social worker also occurred in October 1994. 
Outside Agencies 
Mention has already been made of the professionals outside the Office of the Family 
Advocate who became involved. When Jaco and his mother became aware of the problem 
with the children during the July 1993 school holidays, the children were immediately taken 
to psychologist A who heard their concerns and assessed the children. It was the 
psychologist's opinion that the children should not be returned home. No report in this 
regard was obtained from her due to the fee involved, which Jaco realised he could not 
afford. 
For that reason, the children were referred to psychologist B on August 10, 1993. At this 
stage the children were not returned to their mother and were enroled in a new primary 
school. Anzee was evaluated by means of an intelligence test as well as projective testing, 
including the Columbus (selected cards), the Thematic Apperception Test (selected cards), 
and the Draw-A-Person Test. The twins were evaluated by means of the Nel-Sonnekus 
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Developmental Scale and projective tests including the Draw-A-Person Test, the Children's 
Apperception Test, and the South African Picture Analysis Test. Information was also 
elicited in the form of conversations with the children. In conclusion it was found that: 
1. All three children displayed strong feelings of intense unhappiness, signs of excessive 
punishment, poor preparation for school and intense feelings of rejection. It would 
therefore not be in their interest to return to their mother. It was also found, after a 
conversation with Jaco and Mrs Odendaal, that they (the adults) were not prepared to 
return the children to their mother .under these circumstances; that they were able to care 
for them bot.h financially and emotionally, and that the children were already well adapted 
in their new school and environment; 
2. It seemed essential that the custody order should be amended in the favour of the 
father, and 
3. A report from a social worker with regard to the circumstances of the mother, be 
obtained as these were not known to the psyche•' gist B at the time. 
At about the same time, the social worker A at the Office of the Family Advocate 
requested the assistance of a social worker B of the Department of Welfare in Natal to 
compile a report regarding the circumstances of the mother and stepfather of the children in 
question, in terms of Regulation 6 of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act (24 of 
1987) with regard to amending the custody order. Details of the information known to the 
office at that time {possible molestation and physical abuse), as supplied by the father and 
grandmother, were provided in the request. This request was in turn handed over to the 
Christelik-Maatskaplike Raad, to whom the Kruger family was known, due to their 
involvement in the church. Information for the compilation of a report was obtained by 
means of interviews with Sandra and Karel Kruger, the class teachers of the primary school 
in Natal, which the children had attended before, and two friends of the family. Written 
reports were also obtained from these teachers. 
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The report from the social worker B indicated that (a) Sandra and Karel Kruger could be 
described as adequate and caring parents, who valued family life and were well integrated 
in community life, including church and school activities and voluntary group programmes, 
and who sought help voluntarily in order to have their children returned to them; (b) 
although they were able to provide for basic needs, the family was suffering financially; (c) 
a problematic relationship existed between Karel Kruger and Mrs Odendaal and that Mrs 
Odendaal was known to this family to be manipulating, possessive of her grandchildren and 
domineering in terms of her son, Jaco, which made this social worker believe that the 
motives for amendment of custody and allegations made should be questioned, as well as 
Jaco's ability, independent of his mother, to take responsibility for the children based on his 
record of non-involvement and non-payment; (d) allegations of sexual molestation of Anzee 
by Karel therefore appeared unlikely, and that allegations of physical abuse of the twins 
were more a case of strict discipline and choice of corporal punishment; and (e) the Kruger 
couple for that reason could be regarded as fit and responsible pa:ents. 
The report from the primary school in Natal, regarding Anzee, indicated that she was a 
good pur,;. spontaneous, neat in her work and well groomed. Mention was made of her 
involvement in the "Help-Span 11 group after her mother informed the school of her 
allegations of molestation, and it was noted by the teacher that no evidence of emotional 
trauma was evident, so no further intervention was indicated after the matter was discussed 
with Sandra. The report regarding Christopher and Colin stated that they were always well 
groomed, had difficulty with formal school work upon which it was decided to return them 
to a pre-school programme, from which they benefitted. The teacher described them as 
quiet and reserved initially, but that they got on well with other children and always looked 
happy and friendly, although they did not communicate with her much. She also reported 
that Sandra often came to enquire about their progress, helped them with work at home, 
and brought them lunch if she could not give it to them in the mornings. 
No written report was obtained from the primary school in Pretoria where the children 
were placed after the July 1993 holidays. A written record ofthe conversation by telephone 
between Anzee's schoolteacher and the social worker A from the Office of the Family 
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Advocate indicated, however, that Anzee was well adapted, but that she exhibited concern 
regarding the care of her siblings at home in NataL This was interpreted as supporting 
evidence for the fact that Anzee was said to have adopted a mothering role with regard to 
all her younger siblings, which was considered inappropriate. 
, 
Christopher and Colin were evaluated by an educational psychologist C connected to th~ 
Pretoria Educational Aid Centre. No report exists, but recorded notes on a conversation by 
telephone, between the social worker A and the psychologist C revealed that the twins have 
an average to above-average intelligence, but underachieve due to identified learning 
restraints. It was recommended that they should be placed in a school for specialised 
education. It was also stated by the school teacher that the twins were reserved and 
exhibited poor communication skills. 
Other outside agents were the attorneys of both the "Applicant" (Jaco) and "Respondent" 
(Sandra), to whom the initial affidavit by both Jaco and his mother, and opposing affidavits 
by Sandra and Karel to both sets of attorneys respectively, were made. Furthermore, these 
attorneys were responsible for all formal correspondence and flow ~A· information between 
their clients and the Office of the Family Advocate. 
Back to the Office of the Familv Advocate 
As a result of the conflicting nature of the information gathered at that time, it was 
deemed essential that a psychologist D, appointed by the family advocate, had to re-assess 
the children. All the information from both sides was made available to her. Apart from 
access to all documentation, psychologist D was also present at the session held at the 
Office of the Family Advocate on September 8, 1993. To assess the children, she used the 
Children's Apperception Test, the Family Systems Test, and the Draw-A-Family Test. She 
concluded: 
l. That custody of the children should be awarded to Jaco Conradie. It was found that 
the children primarily experienced their life at home in Natal as based on themes of lack of 
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physical care and excessive punishment. Furthermore, the children indicated that they 
would prefer to stay with their father and grandmother. It was felt that a strong emotional 
involvement existed between the children their father and grandmother. 
Although a strong emotional tie seemed to exist between the children and their mother, 
there also seemed to be serious problems in the relationship between the stepfather, Karel, 
and the children in terms of exaggerated strictness and excessive physical punishment by 
him. 
It was the impression of this psychologist D that the twins were emotionally and 
intellectually neglected and under-stimulated. Symptoms of enureses and encopreses 
reported by Jaco and Mrs Odendaal were taken as evidence of serious emotional problems 
in the twins. 
Both Sandra and Karel seemed to lack the necessary skill to handle the children in an 
appropriate manner, which lead to Sandra adopting a passive stance and Karel being left to 
discipline, which he seemed to hav" done excessively. The fact that there were five young 
children in the Kruger home and that the family was struggling financially, was felt to be a 
contributing factor to this situation. 
It was her impression that the children were well adapted in their new school and 
environment, and that Jaco was doing as much as possible to manage their needs, especially 
the educational needs of the twins. 
It was not felt that the children were influenced against their mother by Mrs Odendaal. 
She was found to have a strong personality and supportive towards her son, but that he 
took responsibility himself. Jaco impressed as a mature, emotionally stable person, who had 
a strong bond with his children. 
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2. It was recommended that Sandra received regular access to the children, as the 
children had a strong emotional tie with her and they were not in essence considered at risk 
with Karel. 
3. That Jaco, Mrs Odendaal and the children received family therapy. 
With this information as well as all the above mentioned results at hand, the social worker 
A connected to the Office of the Family Advocate drew up a report summarising that: 
1. Although the Respondent, Sandra Kruger, and her husband were concerned and caring 
parents, certain constraining factors seemed to oppose their efforts. These factors included 
that: 
The Kruger-family's poor financial position, led to the children's claim that there 
was insufficient food for them. 
Both Sandra and Karel exhibited an inability to handle their five children 
simultaneously, which resulted in Anzee being over-involved ·in the care of her 
younger siblings. Both the Respondent and her husband described the twins as 
"naughty" resulting in frequent, excessive discipline. 
All three children, but especially the twins experienced serious emotional problems 
that could not be ascribed to the dispute around custody only. 
2. It was acknowledged and understood that both the Respondent and Mr Kruger had 
strong feelings around the dispute, and it was stated that the Christelik-Maatskaplike Raad 
was prepared to support the Kruger couple in order to handle and work through the 
situation. 
3. The children were well adjusted to theiccircumstances at their father's home at that 
time. Their problems were being addressed and the Applicant, Jaco, was found to be a 
suitable and capable parent, and could take responsibility for the children. 
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4. The place of the Respondent as the biological parent could, however, not be denied, 
and continued contact between her and the children would be in the best interest of the 
children. The Applicant acknowledged the role of the Respondent as mother and would 
endeavour to maintain said contact. The Applicant would also need support to handle the 
situation. He was therefore prepared to enlist the help of psychological services with a view 
to family therapy. 
The social worker A's report contained the above mentioned recommendations and reads 
as follows: 
That custody of the minor children, Anzee, Christopher and Colin be amended and 
awarded to Jaco Conradie. 
That Sandra Kruger be awarded reasonable access to the children. 
That Sandra receives assistance from the C.M.R. in order to deal with the emotional 
issues surrounding this matter. 
That Jaco receives psychological assistance with a professional ofhis own choice, in 
the form of family therapy. 
On October 19, 1993, a final report with recommendations to the court was drawn up by 
the family advocate. All the information regarding the case gained from interviews as well 
as expert reports, was detailed. Any discrepancies of facts were listed and commented 
upon. These included: 
1. The alleged molestation of Anzee. The advocate commented that in all probability 
Karel was not the perpetrator. He stated that although it would seem that an isolated 
incident by an unknown person had occurred, he was advised that she had no negative or 
unresolved emotions in that regard. 
2. That the Respondent was indeed a loving and concerned mother, which impression 
was verified by all parties consulted and was also the impression of the panel. 
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3. That the three children were not really difficult (neither at the office nor at the private 
rooms of psychologist D by whom they were evaluated). Nevertheless it was found that the 
Respondent experienced an inability to handle the children effectively. It seemed that she 
disciplined too little and expected Karel to "over-discipline" to compensate. The fact that 
the family was struggling financially also contributed to a situation in which the couple 
found themselves unable to handle the children. Punishment did take place, especially with 
regard to the twins, which appeared to be excessive. It did seem that situations arose in 
which the couple simply, out of desperation, relied on a hiding in order to control the 
children. 
The final recommendation reads as follows: 
Custody and control of all three children is awarded to Jaco. 
Reasonable access is given to Sandra. 
Jaco and the children should receive family therapy for as long as the professional 
involved deems necessary. 
Sandra receives sen-1.;es from the C.M.R. for as long as the agency deems 
necessary. 
On November 4, 1993 a settlement agreement of the Supreme Court in respect of the 
application between Jaco Conradie and Sandra Kruger, with regard to custody of the minor 
children, was signed by both parties. According to this agreement, control and custody of 
the minor children were awarded to the Applicant (Jaco) subject to the right of the 
Respondent (Sandra) to reasonable access. Such reasonable access was defined as one 
weekend per month, every July school holiday and half of every December holiday with 
every alternative Christmas day included. 
Descriptions of Descriptions of the Svstems Involved 
What follows are distinctions drawn by me, based on the distinctions I drew from the 
study of epistemology which is the process of my knowing or constructing this experience. 
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The recursive nature of an ecosystemic epistemology is demonstrated by the means in 
which the concepts discussed in chapter 3 return here, informed by what has been described 
above, while what has been described above, is generated from within the broader frame of 
this epistemology, as defined in chapter 3. 
The Definition of the Problem 
The history of custody disputes clearly illustrated that, both the legal fraternity as well as 
the behavioural sciences recognised that the problem of awarding custody, could not 
sufficiently be addressed within the framework of one discipline. Hence the creation of this 
Office ofthe Family Advocate, with a special family legal advisor, family consultants in the 
form of a social. worker, expert consultants in the form of psychologists as well as other 
community social agents such as teachers and religious leaders, who are called upon to 
become involved. In this sense it becomes a multidisciplinary approach -a seemingly logical 
solution for dealing with a complex problem. The term 'multidisciplinary approach' does 
become misleading as it does not signify a unified approach. To the extent that it signifies 
H any disciplines it would seem to be accurate. From the case study it becomes clear that 
making a custody recommendation involves the following process: the collection of data, 
the ordering of that data within a certain framework, the formulation of hypothesis (these 
first three components being ongoing), and finally the formulation of an intervention in the 
form of a recommendation which is presented as a settlement agreement. As Auerswald 
(1968) points out, the key step in this sequence is the way in which the data is organised 
within a certain framework, as this step determines the previous step namely the collection 
of information as well as everything that happens subsequently. With the multidisciplinary 
approach as practised in the above case study, each professional remains within the 
framework of their own discipline, which implies a selected focus or a narrowing of the 
ecological field. 
In this case the family advocate, in legal tradition, defines the problem in terms of 
gathering facts and investigating contradictory ones to the extent that these are detailed and 
in his final report, which is 'never arbitrary' and is drawn up according to 'entrenched legal 
,, 
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principles'. Parties are interviewed individually and "relevant disputes of law and fact 
outlined" (Bosman, 1994, p.1 0). Parties express their views and any opposing views of one 
party are put to the other, therefore on a micro and less formal level, a perpetuation of the 
adversarial approach. Naturally, from within such a framework this is appropriate. 
Conversely, from the social work point of view, the problem is defined as one of social 
circumstances, which in turn is defined by a finite number of indicators including; 
indications of pathology; financial status; accommodation and facilities; school, church and 
community involvement; psycho-social history; availability of social and educational 
facilities, to mention only a· few. The legal discipline hierarchically remains the dominant 
one, to the extent that certain legal concepts are borrowed by social workers in this setting 
and incorporated into their discipline, such as legal terminology and the requirements of the 
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act (24 of 1987). The overarching legal view is 
easily incorporated, as determining social circumstances also relies heavily on the 
accumulation of facts, although often more 'arbitrary' due to the inferences that need to be 
made. 
Generally more abstract and therefore less factual, is the definition of the problem from 
the consultant psychologist's perspective. For that reason the marriage between the law and 
psychology is traditionally more uneasy than that between the legal system and social work. 
In the psychological sphere the definition is based on the children's intrapsychic conflicts as 
projected in testing and the strength of the emotional bonds among children and their 
parents as inferred from clinical impressions as well as the children's projective testing. In 
this case the concept of 'proof' and 'objectivity' is borrowed from the legal discipline, hence 
the need for testing as well as the role of the psychologist as expert consultant. 
The Relationship Between Systems 
The sequence of this process for a custody recommendation was conducted from within 
each discipline with the result that the "interfaces between the conceptual frameworks .of 
different disciplines ... [were] ignored" and as a result "the interfaces between the arenas of 
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systemic life operation ... represented by the different disciplines ... [were] also ignored" 
(Auerswald, 1968, p.204) .. Although there was no unifYing theory in this multidisciplinary 
approach, the common demoninator underlying this process is an almost exclusive focus on 
the content of information gained while the context of such data is lost. As a result of the 
different frameworks of the various disciplines the only way in which to communicate with 
each other and be understood was in terms of the content or inferred construction, based 
on content. 
A focus on content resulted in the theoretical framework of each discipline determining 
the perspective on these facts and therefore the way in which they were interpreted. The 
dominant discipline being a legal one, and the focus being on content, the ecological field is 
narrowed down to a set of dualities or antimonies such as good parent versus bad parent; 
true versus untrue statements; emotional needs versus physical needs; responsibility versus 
irresponsibility; financial stability versus financial instability; and family stability versus 
family instability. Such a narrowing down would seem appropriate from within the context 
of making a recommendation for custody as a single solution was seemingly needed. 
However, from a higher-order or ecosystemic view with a focus on the context and 
therefore the relationships between both family members and professionals, the dualistic 
frames of content are transcended. In Rappaport's ( 1981) view taking account of context 
serves to maintain the dynamic tension or dialectic that exists between antimonies, which 
avoids one-sidedness and requires divergent solutions. In much the same way Cecchin 
(1987) favours multiple descriptions, rather than looking for true and false explanations, as 
a way of remaining truly neutral, and recognising the complexity of interaction. Anderson 
and Goolishian (1988) advocate maintaining openness in the therapeutic conversation, 
rather than narrowing the focus or becoming too committed to one idea, in order to 
promote the emergence of multiple realities. All these authors, however, become one-sided 
in reflecting their conscious preference for focusing on an aesthetic position - a tendency 
towards holism and complexity. 
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A focus on context in this case would be an apparent disregard for content messages such 
as alleged molestation, harsh punishment, alleged underfeeding, and neglect of educational 
needs which serves to ignore the relationships and contexts within which such statements 
and allegations were originally created. Dualisms can, however, be seen as the two sides of 
a complementary relationship, and in order to transcend this, one is to search for the 
pattern or relationships that connect both sides of such a distinction. A focus on the 
relationships would inspire possible questions such as: Why has this become an issue 
between the parents now? What changes in the relationships among the players lead to the 
father's renewed interest in his children? Why is the grandmother living with father now? 
What role does she play now? How was she involved with the family in the past? Why did 
the mother encourage renewed contact with the children now? How is the stepfather's role 
defined vis-a-vis the father? 
From my position as participant observer it became apparent that the focus on outcome 
(i.e. making a recommendation for custody) resulted in a pragmatic position adopted by all 
the disciplines who became involved. Such a position requires the reduction of phenomena, 
in the form of content gathered, into smaller and more manageable bits with an erLphasis on 
utility. This position also assumes that the information that is not useful within such a frame 
is not included. From a iegal perspective, the utility of information is guided by the 
principle of what is in 'the best interest of the child'. As a consequence, in order to 
operationalise ('pragmatise') such a frame, would require the creation of categories such as 
financial ability; emotional bonds; children's needs and parental capabilities as a way of 
reducing the phenomena into manageable bits. It is within this process of simplification and 
focus on outcome that the other disciplines are co-opted by the legal system into answering 
the pragmatic questions posed from a legal perspective. The role of any other discipline is 
therefore already defined, namely as one of bringing in their technical skills in 
eliciting/finding/proving that which is already predetermined as the question. Hence the 
focus on testing by psychologists, and the gathering of hard psycho-social facts by social 
workers. For example in this case, the educational needs of the children were already 
defined as one category for determining what is in the best interest of children. As the 
category was predetermined, the only role for the psychologist was to test in order to 
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confirm that need. Such confirmation is naturally needed as the legal system is based on 
'proof. 
An ecosystemic perspective embraces the dialectic of pragmatics and aesthetics. As 
illustrated above, these concepts are of different logical levels. Pragmatics in this case refers 
. 
to posing questions by means of predetermined categories, while aesthetics would refer to 
questioning the process of posing questions by means of predetermined categories. 
Embracing these concepts therefore means the embodiment of two patterns namely 
reductionism and holism, with a necessary juxtapositioning between them so that it 
becomes an interactive system of description (aesthetics) and action (pragmatics). T~is 
implies that these two patterns are related through the logic of complementarity. It means 
that if one is aware of the recursive nature of these patterns existing together, it may be 
appropriate or convenient to adopt either position at a particular time. Consequently it 
follows that if one is aware of creating categories and dualities from within a higher-order 
view or (an aesthetic awareness), such a pragmatic position becomes appropriate. Without 
an aesthetic or higher-order awareness pragmatic concerns become one's realities within 
which it becomes impossible to acknowledge th,,• any other reality may exist. In this way it 
becomes impossible for any professional involved in this case to acknowledge that any 
other set of facts may have been equally relevant without taking a higher-order view or 
questioning one's questions. Keeney (1983a) asserts that when technique (pragmatics) is 
not informed by higher orders of cybernetic process it leads to the creation of new 
problems or the perpetuation of pathology. Techniques within the pragmatic frame of 
making a custody recommendation, are designed to alleviate the crisis that arise in a family, 
within a limited time-span, but may induce new problems or perpetu~te the pathology in the 
family as a result of being insensitive to the wider ecology or context of which such 
problems are a part. Paradoxically, a pragmatic position with a focus on technique, skill 
and proof results from the sense of 'responsibility' associated with making a custody 
decision. Yet, from an aesthetic base our responsibility is towards the contextualisation of 
our techniques and the recursive questioning of our assumptions. 
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From our viewpoint, which some may consider extreme, this 
position is irresponsible because the therapist who takes this 
stance often lacks the capacity to examine the pragmatic 
consequences of his own behaviour. He is not aware that his 
way of acting and thinking has become part of the problem. 
(Cecchin, Lane & Ray, 1992, p.8) 
An integration between description and action or aesthetics and pragmatics is mediated 
by means of the language of the observer. The use of linear language inevitably leads to 
dualistic framings and a reduction of the whole. However, one way of addressing the 
dialectic through language is by means of Bateson's (1979) principle of double description. 
In this sense the simultaneous combination of the punctuations of all the disciplines 
involved provide a glance at the whole interactive system of the Office of the Family 
Advocate. In turn, these relations discerned by means of double description could be 
discussed in terms of logical typing and the dialectic between form and process or 
hierarchical structure of experience, which is recursively linked. 
In order to do that, I would first have to discern the typology of process or logical typing 
by means of which I have come to decide on selectively focusing on the level of the ecology 
of relationships (system) of the Office of the Family Advocate. 
On the fist level (having described how I have come to be involved with this family) the 
children's holiday with their father leading to the presenting problems of molestation, 
physical abuse, and emotional and physical malnourishment resulted in an application by the 
father to amend the custody order, which was disputed by the mother. Such a description 
of process culminates in a s·emantic label called a custody case. This is the classification of 
form or naming of the pattern summarised above, and occurs on the level ofthe family. On 
the next hierarchical level, the process culminating in a case of disputed custody results in 
the mobilisation of the people who work in the Office of the Family Advocate which 
involves the gathering of information from both parties and by means of the use of various 
professionals, the compiling of reports and finally the making a recommendation. The name 
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or semantic label awarded to this process of behaviour and relationships can be termed an 
inquiry and occurs on the level of the Office of the Family Advocate, which incorporates 
the lower level of the family. The following level or meta-context involves my own process 
of gathering information by means of doing a literature study,· sitting in on interviews, 
conducting my own interviews, having access to reports as well as all the persons involved 
over time. The semantic label or classification of form I have chosen for this process is that 
of a participant observer. This meta-level therefore includes not only the level of the family 
and the Office ofthe Family Advocate but also myself, which in tum is recursively linked to 
the level of the family and the level of the Office of the Family Advocate. This then 
becomes the formal way of understanding the construction of the reality of this study. 
In turn, I chose to focus selectively on the second level of system of the Office of the 
Family Advocate and the process that is termed an inquiry. Clearly as illustrated above, 
such a focus is informed by both the levels of the family as well as my own ecology of ideas 
as they are recursively linked. 
A focus on this level of the events as I experienced them af~d the orders of abstraction I 
have imposed, can be mapped onto Bateson's (1979) typology of proce~s .. On the first 
hierarchical level the description of process involves the actions of the father's application 
for the amendment of the custody order, and the sworn affidavits by both parties relating to 
the allegations made or grounds for amending custody. On the abstract level, these actions 
determine the frame, namely a socio-legal one which is to be imposed on the actions 
following on the next levels. Such a frame is formalised by the Mediation in Certain 
Divorce Matters Act (24 of 1987). On the next hierarchical level the definition of the 
problem results in separate interviews with the parties by a multidisciplinary panel, 
including an interview with the children, the requisition of a report from an outside social 
work agency as well as psychologists, school reports, psychometric testing of the children 
by an expert consultant, the scrutiny of any evidence provided by the members of the 
family, and the discussion of these facts by the members of the multidisciplinary team. 
These actions clearly constitute the gathering of content data which is more abstractly 
referred to as an inquiry. On the third level the actions or description of process involve the 
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creation of categories considered important in determining what would be in the best 
interest of the children, which is then superimposed on the data gathered in the fonn of a 
final report. The abstract formulation of this process is called a recommendation. 
This typology illustrates the previous discussion of the extent to which other 
professionals only become involved on the level of the gathering of information - that is, on 
the level of looking at content - the nature of this process having been detennined at the 
previous level as conducted from within a legal frame. 
It becomes apparent that during the inquiry at the Office of the Family Advocate, that 
information was gathered through the lens of a socio-legal frame. The story or narrative 
that was elicited from the family was not so much 'their story' as it was the story of the 
people involved in having to decide. 
Back to the Family 
One year after the final recommendation was made and the custody order amended in 
favour of Jaco, I contacted the family again. Jaco indicated (by way of Sandra) that he was 
not willing to expose the children further, and therefore did not wish to participate in 
further discussion. As he had moved and I did not have his telephone number, I could also 
not reach him directly. His reason for refusal wa~, according to Sandra, that the children 
had been through enough and that he did not wish the whole matter to be dragged up 
again. Sandra was, however, willing to speak to me and the following infonnation about 
the family was obtained: During the preceding year, Sandra saw her children on two 
occasions (school holidays). She said that everything went well during the holidays and that 
the children looked 'OK'. She was concerned about Anzee because she seemed a little quiet. 
With regard to herself, Sandra described herself as very depressed and bitter at times during 
the year. She consulted a psyc:;hologist for about a year, and claimed that she felt better, but 
that she still had days when she was overcome by feelings of depression. She is still in 
therapy. She and Karel do not discuss the children's removal, but she knows that he misses 
them too. Her two youngest children also experienced the loss, and Sharon (now aged 5) 
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cries for Anzee often. Sandra subsequently found an office job and has been working for 
several months now, which also relieves most of their financial burdens. 
Reflecting on her experience at the Office of the Family Advocate, Sandra indicated that 
it all seemed unreal to her, and that she never once believed that her children would really 
be taken from her, as she had always been their parent, and Jaco didn't even know them 
very well. That is also why she was convinced that Mrs Odendaal 'orchestrated' these 
events, because she did not believe that Jaco would have gone to these lengths on his own 
initiative. 
Sandra is determined to re-apply for custody with the help of her psychologist, and feels 
that Jaco might not even dispute it. According to Sandra, Jaco and the children never did 
go for family therapy as was recommended. He gave up the five-bedroomed house he had 
rented for himself, his mother and the children a few months after the inquiry. Jaco and the 
children are now living in a three-bedroomed house, with a girlfriend and her child. Mrs 
Odendaal no longer lives with them. Jaco apparently told her to leave, as she became too 
much for him. This is the second girlfriend he has had living with theriL According to 
Sandra, the twins only attended the remedial school for a few weeks, after which the father 
was told that there was nothing much wrong with them and that they could be placed in an 
ordinary school. They now are attending the same primary school as Anzee. 
More Descriptions of Descriptions 
The process by which a custody recommendation is made, is guided by the principle of 
what is in the best interest of the children. In this case, the best interest of the children were 
ascertained in an adversarial manner. The vague standards that define such 'best interests' 
give parties an incentive to fight. Both Sandra and Jaco are in their own right good or 
adeq~_ate parents. The existence of a structure such as the Office of the Family Advocate 
and the legal process of making a custody recommendation, provided them with a content 
through which to attempt to resolve issues arising from the continued relationships between 
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them and their families. Through entering this process the parties were immediately 
polarised and conflict engendered through the nature of the process. 
However, when one views the outcome of this dispute and the nature of the relationships 
one year after the amendment to the custody order, it becomes apparent that the process in 
the families that preceded the application for custody, is still ongoing, and that events 
transpired that were not anticipated or taken into account when the custody 
recommendation was made. It is not my intention to evaluate the decision to award custody 
to Jaco, but to indicate that the assumptions upon which the process of deciding were 
based, are erroneous. It implies that it is mistaken to believe that one can find legal 
solutions to personal matters. It implies that although parents, such as Jaco and Sandra, 
have conflicting interests regarding the children, it is not these that keep them from 
reaching agreement regarding custody, but rather the unresolved issues that exist in the 
relationships between them and other family members, that may have little to do with who 
has custody of the children. Fighting about custody only provides them with a context 
through· which to attempt to address these issues. It is therefore mistaken to believe that a 
custody dispute can be settled tn· the assignment of blame 'or parental culpability and that 
single causal factors in the past can be identified. It is mistaken to believe that the focus of 
custody is on the past and not the future. 
The outcome of this disputed custody was therefore the cessation of the legal conflict, 
but not the resolution of the issues between them. This is clearly borne out by the fact that 
once again the issue of custody has arisen - now from Sandra's side. The focus on content 
during evaluation, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, also resulted in change of content 
over time. It would seem that Sandra is now the 'more stable' of the two parents in terms of 
finances, work and accommodation, and she is the one seen to be receiving the help 
recommended by the family advocate, in the form of therapy. On Jaco's side, changes of 
school, residence, jobs and relationships have occurred which creates the content around 
which a new application for custody (from Sandra's side) can be made. 
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Therefore, when viewed over time, in the way in which it was done in this study, the 
custody recommendation made in the 'best interest of the children' resulted in a change of 
the position of the players on the field, Jaco now being the custodial parent and the children 
living in Pretoria, but the process has remained the same - the issue between the parents 
remain unresolved and one is portrayed as more good than the other. New content has been 
created around which a dispute for custody can be initiated. Consequently, as far as the 
interests of the children are concerned, they are still living in a process of disputed custody, 
for, although the roles have changed and the 'goodies' have become the 'baddies', the 
process for them has remained the same. They are still living with the guilt that arises from 
divided loyalty between disputing parents, which will no doubt again be reflected m 
projective testing, such which would necessarily follow a new custody inquiry. 
The inquiry into the disputed custody in the Conradie v Kruger case captured a moment 
in time and space, in the ongoing relationships between the people involved, and the 
content as presented at that time was arranged into categories which served as guidelines in 
determining what would be in th~ best interest of the children. The focus on the past and 
linear causality precludes the necessity to follow up, as it is assumed that the conflict· is 
resolved. Such a lack of involvement over time allows the professionals involved to believe 
that an ethical and moral conclusion was reached that would result in a change in 
relationships. However, the change occurred in the actors and not the play - a play in which 
the roles assigned to the children were not really made any less difficult. 
In order for the experience to have been meaningful for the family, a focus on context and 
the interface between multiple stories would have been necessary, irrespective of outcome. 
On another level, when the professionals involved begin to reflect on their own assumptions 
- their ability for self-reflexivity - they begin to acquire a position that is both ethical and 
therapeutic and therefore responsible (Cecchin et al., 1992). In moving towards such a 
position they attempt to "remain free from the co-optive nature of consensual belief, to be 
willing not to become a true believer in what...[one] is asked to do by the state, or the 
institution, or even the clinic in which ... [ one] works11 (p.9). 
CHAPTER6 
A New Look at Mediation 
An ecosystemic epistemology as defined in this study is a way of maintaining the dialectic 
between aesthetics and pragmatics. In turn, the approach to making custody 
recommendations is determined by outcome and therefore reflects primarily pragmatic 
concerns. In simplifying, a pragmatic concern results in a focus on method and, as stated, 
on outcome. Aesthetics is concerned with higher orders of mental process which requires 
self-reflexivity and seeks to uncover the patterns that connect these. In an attempt to 
embrace the dialectic between these concepts, juxtaposed and described throughout this 
dissertation, I will propose that mediation, informed by ecosystemic epistemology as 
meta-theory, may serve as an appropriate theory or method for addressing the pragmatic 
concerns of custody disputes. In this sense, mediation could be seen as an intervention 
directed at the level of system of the family and the professionals involved in a custody 
dispute. 
It has been stated that mediation is named as one of the functions of the family advocate 
in terms of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act (24 of 1987) although such 
mediation is not defined by the Act (Bosman, 1994). 
The concept of mediation has however been developed and 
given content administratively and has been implemented as 
part of the procedure when an inquiry is conducted by the 
family advocate. Put in a nutshell, the family advocate aims 
to settle the matter between the parties with maximum 
participation of the parties and the children ... on terms most 
favourable to the welfare of the children. (p. 7) 
This quotation, which forms part of a definition of the role of the family advocate in 
South Africa, implies an attempt at co-opting family members in reaching a settlement. In 
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this way the term mediation is therefore given content, and employed as a term denoting a 
means of conflict resolution that can be contrasted with the adversarial approach. An 
awareness does, however, exist that this definition does not conform to the adherence to a 
strict model and theory of mediation. No such model is practised as part of court-connected 
'mediation' services. 
Through this study it has become apparent that disputed custody, and what is in the best 
interest of the children, are more complex than deciding who is a most suitable parent. This 
awareness comes from viewing the process of relationships within a family over time. In the 
current system of making custody recommendations, no provision is made for follow-up 
evaluations and interventions, and the context of information used in addressing pragmatic 
concerns are not included in the definition of the problem. The metaphor of mediation is 
proposed as a means of addressing both these concerns. Pragmatically, mediation in this 
sense could therefore involve: (a) the assessment of families as a whole system and the 
nature of the relationships between all subsystems and how these give rise to the need for 
legal intervention; (b) the co-evolution (with the family) of acceptable arrangements that 
minimise cJunflict and provide structure and predictability for the children, and.(c) follow-up 
sessions over a period of a few months, for purposes of re-assessment and dealing with new 
issues as or if they arise, which at the end of this process will result in an order made by the 
court. This process should therefore also include regular contact between professionals 
involved in which ideas are exchanged and assumptions challenged. 
In addition to a growing awareness of court-connected mediation, a number of private 
initiatives, formalising the use of family mediation, have seen the light. Most noteworthy is 
the establishment of the South African Association of Mediators in Family Matters 
(SAAM), as a result of the collaboration between representatives of the disciplines of law; 
psychology and social work. The most prominent functions of SAAM are the promotion of 
family mediation, the education of both professionals and the public in this regard, the 
training of qualified mediators, ongoing research as well as the determination of standards 
of practice (Hoffmann & Wentzel, 1992). 
.> 
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The models of mediation and the training of mediators proposed by SAAM and other 
independent authors are considered commendable and thorough efforts in addressing the 
. 
pragmatic need for alternative dispute resolution of family matters in South Africa. The 
emphasis of this study, however, does not warrant an analysis thereof, and the reader is 
referred to Hoffmann's (1992) Family Mediation in South Africa for a most concise review 
of the current thinking in this regard. 
From a second-order or meta-perspective with an epistemological concern it follows that 
when a need such as family mediation is identified, the service that arises from it, is 
characterised by fragmentation and specialisation, and the need rather than the person or 
family becomes the focus for intervention (Fruggeri, Telfuer, Castellucci, Marzari & 
Matteini, 1991 ). The inherent danger in such an approach is that it underscores a 
"worldview which attributes meanings to behaviours, events and phenomena which are 
separated from the process of social interaction from which these behaviours, events and 
phenomena emerge" (p.xviii). The definition of the problem to be addressed, namely family 
disputes, determines the context and therefore also the system to be treated, namely the 
family. However, the social structures such as the pr·:'-..:essionals involved in family 
mediation are also determined by, as they determine, the system to be treated and "cannot 
then be thought of as neutral with respect to the way systems are determined by the 
problem" (p.xix). In recognising such a co-construction, the problem determined system 
includes the social service or professionals involved (Goolishian & Anderson, 1987). Such 
a system represents the starting point for a process of actions which is geared to trigger 
change- "a process which is not limited to the client, but that will involve also the premises 
of professionals and staff in relation to which clients and services have been constructed" 
(Fruggeri et al., 1991, p.xix). 
Looking at the history of the development of the need for an alternative form of 
intervention in family disputes again, two phases can be discerned: 
1. A growing awareness of the dual nature of family disputes such as custody issues, 
allowed for the reorganisation of services (creation of the Office of the Family Advocate) 
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following new divorce legislation (Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987). 
This allowed for the involvement of other disciplines, in line with the growing awareness to 
psycho-social aspects of divorce and custody issues, in what was traditionally only a legal 
domain. Such a development may be seen as a first step in an evolutionary process of 
making the service of family dispute resolution more connected with the environment which 
makes for increased complexity. 
2. The second phase has seen increased communication between professionals in the form 
of the multidisciplinary teamwork as it is currently practised. This phase can also be seen as 
an attempt at integrating different approaches and languages, be it under the rubric of the 
law or by the creation of a new model (mediation) fed by various disciplines. This second 
phase is, however, still characterised by (adapted from Fruggeri et al., 1991): 
viewing the professionals as outside the system to be addressed; 
professionals being unaware of their own functioning or institutional demands; 
a total focus on the problem and the techniques with which to intervene; 
the utilisatiun of dichotomies such as adversary versus mediation, and 
a search for an integrated viewpoint or meta-synthesis. 
This phase, characterised by an emphasis on technique, denotes a pragmatic stance. 
It is proposed that a third phase is entered, whereby this evolutionary process is taken 
beyond reductionism, technique and the search for one integrated view, towards greater 
complexity and the amplification of difference, through the proposed metaphor of 
mediation. Such an (aesthetic) definition of mediation would be characterised by (adapted 
from Fruggeri et al., 1991): 
. a greater awan:!ness of the different services offered by everyone involved and the 
relationships between them; 
efforts to create a coherent team working on each case in the form of an evolving 
and changing meaning system; 
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the planning of strategies that may include cooperation with other agencies; 
including oneself as part of the problem system, and 
the acceptance of complementarity or the construction of knowledge through 
relations, which implies a rejection of a privileged and 'correct' way of observation 
and explanation. 
Mediation defined as such implies that the integration of many perspectives is based on a 
social construction of knowledge within which each professional involved will attend to an 
aspect of a whole system resulting in an intervention or recommendation which is more 
than the sum of all these parts (Fruggeri et al., 1991 ). Similarly the focus is broadened to 
include the professionals as part of the system being observed. In this sense it truly becomes 
- as the title of this dissertation indicates - disputed custody and the people involved: an 
ecosystemic perspective. 
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